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Arbitral Autonomy
L. Ali Khan∗
ABSTRACT
This Article presents concrete proposals to amend the current
arbitration law for minimizing court intervention into arbitration
proceedings and enforcement of arbitral awards. As a method of
dispute resolution, arbitration offers an alternative to litigation. Yet
arbitration is frequently interspersed with litigation. As a true
alternative, arbitration can and should be autonomous, that is,
litigation free. Arbitral autonomy fails when parties go to court to
challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement, to obtain
emergency relief, or to contest enforceability of the award, among
other reasons. To accomplish litigation-free arbitration, first, the
need to go to court must be minimized; second, the desire to go to
court must be deterred. In developing arbitral autonomy, this Article
offers theoretically defensible and practically feasible proposals to
remove both the need and the desire to go to court. In endorsing
arbitral autonomy, however, this Article warns against an
arbitration blackout that thrives on secrecy, quasi-lawlessness, and
pro-arbitration judicial exuberance—a blackout that hurts weak and
vulnerable parties drawn into mandatory arbitration.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1981, the Connecticut Supreme Court offered an insightful
paradigm: “Arbitration is a contractual remedy designed to expedite
informal dispute resolution. Its autonomy requires a minimum of
judicial intrusion.”1 Although other jurisdictions rarely cite the
Connecticut court’s words,2 the autonomy of arbitration, as a
guiding paradigm for restraining judicial intrusion, is a topic in need
1. State v. Conn. Emps. Union Indep., 440 A.2d 229, 230 (Conn. 1981)
(citations omitted).
2. As of February 14, 2013, the Westlaw “all cases” database revealed only
seven cases, all in Connecticut, which repeat this formulation of the autonomy of
arbitration.
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of scholarly attention. Autonomous arbitration occurs when it is
initiated, conducted, and concluded, and the arbitration award is
enforced, all without any need or desire for judicial intervention.3
Endorsing the autonomy paradigm in its own words, the U.S.
Supreme Court has affirmed “the unmistakably clear congressional
purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by the parties
to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in
the courts.”4 Derived from the contract theory of arbitration,5
arbitration statutes, court rulings, and arbitrational institutional rules,
the autonomy paradigm proposed in this Article offers concrete
suggestions for minimizing court intervention in arbitration
processes and outcomes. If these proposals aimed at transforming
the technical infrastructure of arbitration law6 are adopted,
arbitration will undergo a revolutionary change, developing into a
complete alternative to litigation. In presenting these proposals, this
Article invites scholars, lawyers, and judges to further refine the
concept of arbitral autonomy (or the “autonomy paradigm”)7 that is
framed in this Article.
The autonomy paradigm does not advocate that arbitration, as a
method of dispute resolution, is inherently superior to litigation.
Rather, litigation conducted in public courts is critical for clarifying
cases and statutes for future guidance. Arbitration cannot supplant
litigation. In the past few decades, however, arbitration has gone
well beyond commercial dispute resolution; it has proliferated in
numerous areas of law reserved for litigation, including antitrust
laws and statutory rights. The historical common law prejudice
against pre-dispute arbitration clauses has waned, expanding the
scope of arbitration.8 Courts burdened with cases are eager to
3. Developments in the Law — The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1851, 1862−63 (2000) (stating that courts and commentators are conflicted
over the efficiency benefits and fairness concerns of arbitration).
4. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404
(1967).
5. The contract theory of arbitration, as explained in this Article, states that
arbitration is a creature of contract. Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution
that parties choose by means of a contract. Under the contract theory, therefore,
arbitration cannot be imposed on a party without the party’s consent.
6. Unless otherwise indicated, “arbitration law” refers to the Federal
Arbitration Act, the Uniform Arbitration Act, state and federal cases decided
under these statutes, and common law. Even though this Article is confined to the
United States, the principles discussed may have universal appeal and application.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000), 1 U.L.A. 1
(2009).
7. This Article uses “arbitral autonomy” and “autonomy paradigm” as
synonymous concepts.
8. Common law was averse to enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements
but was wholly willing to enforce post-dispute arbitration agreements. In the 19th
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uphold arbitration agreements to lighten their dockets.9 Even
lawmakers facing budget rationing have little interest in opposing
arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution because
litigation costs money to the public treasury.10
Unfortunately, arbitration as currently practiced does not free up
judicial resources, nor does arbitration necessarily lead to arbitral
autonomy. Arbitration law has left open numerous escape routes for
parties to resort to litigation. Parties may choose arbitration by
means of an agreement, either before or after disputes arise.11 In
most cases, the agreement obligates parties to settle either specific or
all disputes by arbitration. By choosing arbitration, obligated
parties12 give up the right to litigate disputes identified in the
arbitration agreement. In reality, however, arbitration parties may
not completely abandon litigation and their arbitration may be
interspersed with litigated disputes, a phenomenon that may be

century, courts would not enforce the arbitration agreement if a party changed its
mind after the dispute arose. Justice Story opined that a “reluctant party” cannot be
forced to submit to arbitration and surrender access to common courts of justice.
Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320−21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
9. Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived”
and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 381, 385 (1995)
(arguing that the “hidden motive” behind the pro-arbitration stance is a judicial
desire to reduce case load). There are state judges, however, with dissenting voices
against the invasion of arbitration. In Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939
(Mont. 1994), for example, Justice Trieweiler took issue with “those federal
judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for their ‘heavy case loads’
and who consider the reluctance of state courts to buy into the arbitration program
as a sign of intellectual inadequacy.” Id. at 939 (Trieweiler, J., concurring).
10. Harry Arkin, Dispute Resolution A Comparative Analysis under Differing
Legal Systems, 39A ROCKY. MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11 (1995). (“[I]n litigation, the
taxpayers, not the disputing parties, pay for the Courts, (i.e. the rent for the Court
Room, salaries of the Judges, their clerks, and their administrators.)”). Since 1961,
the volume of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 litigation has exploded more than one hundredfold,
resulting in substantial costs to taxpayers. See STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SWORD &
SHIELD REVISITED: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 142
(Mary Massaron Ross & Edwin P. Voss, Jr. eds., 3rd ed. 2006).
11. Arbitration law no longer requires that the arbitration agreement be in
writing and signed. Responding to the electronic age of emails, faxes, videos, and
audios, the law now requires that there be an authenticated record rather than a
signed writing. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 1(6) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 11
(2009).
12. An “obligated party” means a party that has agreed by means of an
arbitration agreement to settle selected disputes by means of arbitration.
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called “arbitral litigation.”13 The autonomy paradigm is designed to
minimize, if not to completely eliminate, arbitral litigation.
In arbitral litigation, a “renegade party” is one who undercuts the
arbitration agreement and revivifies litigation. The renegade party
may resort to arbitral litigation for a host of reasons at various stages
of arbitration. For example, the renegade party may refuse to submit
to arbitration, challenging the existence of the arbitration agreement.
It may contest the arbitrability of issues submitted to arbitration. The
renegade party may litigate to seek preliminary relief for the
preservation of assets. If arbitration proceedings are successfully
completed, the renegade party may petition the court to vacate the
arbitration award.14 Because the definition of award includes certain
arbitral decisions delivered during the arbitration proceedings, a
party may litigate to vacate such decisions.
As an overarching principle, the autonomy paradigm proposes
that state and federal courts summarily reject challenges to all facets
of arbitration. This rejection is necessary because law rarely
precludes the filing of petitions, including frivolous and meritless
petitions. Arbitral autonomy can be activated, and judicial
intervention denied, as soon as parties choose arbitration to settle
disputes between them. A policy opposing arbitral litigation sends a
forceful systemic message that parties should deliberate before
committing disputes to arbitration because renegade parties will not
be allowed to perforate arbitral autonomy. Arbitral autonomy is
further garrisoned when arbitration organizations15 provide effective
mechanisms to redress meritorious grievances emanating from
arbitration processes and outcomes, thus eliminating the need to go
to court.16
To understand the autonomy paradigm, de jure autonomy must
be distinguished from de facto autonomy. Generally, parties are free
to conduct and conclude arbitration without any court assistance. De
13. “Arbitral litigation” occurs when an arbitration party approaches the court
to contest some aspect of arbitration. Arbitral litigation tends to undermine
arbitration as a true alternative to litigation.
14. Arbitration law allows judicial relief against the enforcement of
arbitration awards for a host of reasons.
15. An “arbitration organization” is “an association, agency, board,
commission, or other entity that is neutral and initiates, sponsors, or administers an
arbitration proceeding or is involved in the appointment of an arbitrator.” UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 1(1) (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 11 (2009).
16. For example, parties should be able to remove partial arbitrators without
going to court. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES § R-17, at 21 (2009), available at http://www
.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestrele
ased (allowing disqualification of an arbitrator for partiality or lack of
independence).
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facto autonomy occurs when all stages of arbitration proceedings are
successfully concluded and the award is enforced without court
intervention. However, when a renegade party seeks court
intervention at any stage of arbitration, de facto autonomy ceases to
exist. Going beyond de facto autonomy, the autonomy paradigm
promotes de jure autonomy. Synonymous with de jure autonomy,
the autonomy paradigm requires that arbitration law effectively
close escape routes to arbitral litigation so that renegade parties have
little incentive to, and might even face penalties if, they seek court
intervention to oppose the arbitration agreement, the arbitration
proceedings, or the arbitration award.
Jurisprudentially, the legal system has not yet fully recognized
that arbitral autonomy offers numerous benefits. In fact, the benefits
of arbitration publicized in legal literature should be associated with
arbitral autonomy and not with arbitration littered with litigation.17
For example, arbitral autonomy makes arbitration a more complete
alternative to litigation as autonomy disconnects arbitration from
litigation. By disconnecting litigation, arbitral autonomy gives
parties the confidence to recruit specialists to resolve complex
disputes18 beyond the expertise of state and federal judges.19
Additionally, cost, efficiency, speed, and the need for confidentiality
make arbitral autonomy much more attractive than arbitration
punctuated with litigation. For resolving international disputes,
parties belonging to different legal systems and traditions may have
17. The advantages of arbitration are listed as following: (1) speedy resolution
of disputes in months rather than years; (2) substantial savings in legal fees and
costs; (3) avoidance of excessive jury verdicts; (4) avoidance of elected state court
judges who favor the plaintiffs’ bar; (5) reduced punitive damages claims; (6)
uniformity of arbitration law and procedures; (7) reduced class action lawsuits; (8)
limited discovery; and (9) limited right to appeal. See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Ballard
Spahr, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Contracts,
1946 PLI/CORP 201, 207−08 (2012).
18. For example, disputes arising out of software, structural engineering,
patents, and similar sciences and technology require sophisticated knowledge of
the relevant field. Experts in the relevant field can be much more effective judges
than lay judges. In many such disputes, the knowledge of sciences may be much
more relevant than the knowledge of law for an efficacious and fair dispute
resolution. See Stuart M. Boyarsky, Not What They Bargained For: Directing the
Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 221,
226 (2013) (stating that arbitrators as experts in the industry can apply the law of
the shop.).
19. Arbitrators may be former state judges, experts, academics, lawyers,
indeed any person that the parties consider to be qualified to resolve the dispute.
Unlike state judges, formally educated in law with considerable law practice
experience, arbitrators may have expertise in areas other than law. See McDonald
v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) (noting that many
arbitrators are not lawyers and may not have expertise in the law of the land).
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little confidence in or familiarity with each other’s court system;
hence, they seek arbitration fortified with autonomy.20 Most
businesses, averse to negative publicity, would prefer autonomous
arbitration over arbitration conducted under the Damoclean sword of
litigation.21
The autonomy paradigm makes several technical proposals
dispersed at appropriate places throughout this Article. These
proposals expand the arbitrator’s22 authority necessary to foreclose
corresponding litigation. Most importantly, the paradigm empowers
the arbitrator to decide whether an arbitration agreement exists and
is enforceable and whether a specific dispute falls within the scope
of an arbitration agreement. Further, the autonomy paradigm confers
upon the arbitrator severability power, that is, the authority to sever
the arbitration agreement from the underlying contract. If the
arbitration agreement is enforceable, arbitration proceeds to settle
the issues, including voidability of the underlying contract.
Additionally, arbitral autonomy empowers the arbitrator to grant
preliminary, emergency, and exemplary relief without any court
assistance. Likewise, the need to go to court is foreclosed when a
private appellate avenue is available to review the arbitration award.
Accordingly, the autonomy paradigm endorses private review of
arbitration awards.
This Article sets forth the argument for arbitral autonomy in the
following sequence. Part II examines the contract theory of
arbitration, emphasizing that parties forfeit the right to litigation
when they select arbitration. Part III discusses the primary attributes
of arbitral autonomy. Part IV examines issues of non-arbitrability,
proposing ways to avoid fractional arbitration that leads to litigation.
Part V argues that the severability doctrine, under which the validity
of an arbitration agreement is analyzed separately from that of the
underlying contract, fortifies arbitral autonomy. Part VI presents the
parity principle under which arbitrators are granted powers equal to
those of trial judges. This parity expedites the arbitration process
20. Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE
L.J. 775, 827−28 (2012). “[A]lthough consensual as a formal matter, accepting
arbitration is, in many circumstances, effectively mandatory for states that wish to
do business with foreign private parties.” Id. at 829.
21. One might argue that parties choose arbitration knowing that if arbitration
goes wrong, the safety net of litigation is available; consequently, arbitral
autonomy might stifle arbitration. (Professor Patricia Judd made this argument
while reviewing this Article.) Whether arbitral autonomy would indeed chill
arbitration is an empirical question that cannot be answered via speculation. In any
event, arbitral autonomy makes arbitration a more authentic and measured method
of dispute resolution.
22. This Article uses the phrase “the arbitrator” to include an arbitration panel
of two, three, or more.
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and eliminates the need to go to court to seek procedural,
emergency, or substantive relief. Part VII makes proposals to avoid
arbitral litigation in the enforcement of arbitration awards. Part VIII
defines the limits of the autonomy paradigm. The discussion warns
against any sightless enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses
(MACs) forced upon consumers and employees. This discussion
strengthens the argument for arbitral autonomy.
II. FORFEITING LITIGATION
The autonomy paradigm postulates that parties definitively
forfeit the right to litigation when they establish contractual
arbitration. As discussed below, the autonomy paradigm respects the
right to litigation that parties enjoy in the absence of an arbitration
agreement. In most legal systems, state-supported courts are
available to settle disputes. Access to courts establishes a systemic
right to litigation. This right to litigation, however, may be
surrendered in favor of arbitration by means of an agreement. Below
is a brief overview of the right to litigation.
A. Right to Litigation
One might argue that a general right to litigate civil disputes has
not been identified as a constitutional or human right.23 Even so, a
right to access courts has been recognized since the early 19th
century.24 The right permeates both criminal and civil cases.25 In
criminal cases, the defendant is armed with a series of constitutional
and human rights to contest charges. The presumption of innocence
is the cardinal principle promised to protect defendants in criminal
cases.26 The right to litigation is protected even in civil cases where
23. The author has been unable to find a constitutional or treaty text that
proclaims “a right to litigation.” However, the absence of these specific words in
constitutions and treaties does not prove that there is no right to litigation. For
example, the right to litigation may be phrased as a right to a judicial forum. See,
e.g., Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998) (recognizing
employees’ rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment
discrimination).
24. See Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality:
Reconsidering the Liberal Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV.
863, 888 (2011).
25. See Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial
Integrity in Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 379−80 (2010) (suggesting
that the Due Process clause and the First Amendment Right to Petition are the
sources of the right to access to courts in both criminal and civil cases).
26. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (holding that the
presumption of innocence is axiomatic and elementary); Estelle v. Williams, 425
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the state itself engages in unlawful activity.27 For example, the right
to litigation is available if the state appropriates private property
without just and prompt compensation. Likewise, the right to
litigation is protected to enforce the right to free speech, the right to
freedom of religion, and, indeed, a complex set of civil, political,
and economic rights. In most legal systems, the people enjoy a right
to litigate civil disputes against state actors and instrumentalities, a
right available to both natural and juridical persons. This right to
litigation allows individuals and businesses to use state-administered
resources, including courts and agencies, to obtain legal and
equitable reliefs.
The right to litigation against non-state entities, including natural
persons and businesses, is a bit more complex in its underpinnings.
While a general, individual-qua-individual right to litigation is rarely
anchored in constitutional protections, one might argue that state
dispute resolution services are indispensable for the enforcement of
fundamental rights against non-state entities. For example, an
employee victimized on the basis of race or religion has the right to
seek relief through the courts. Rights against myriad forms of
discrimination in the private sector would be meaningless if the state
provided no access to remedial litigation. Litigation to protect
constitutional and statutory rights against non-state entities, one
might argue, is so critical that there indeed exists a de facto right to
litigation.28 A state cannot discharge its obligations to protect
ordered liberty if it does not provide dispute resolution services at an
affordable cost.29

U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (holding that the presumption of innocence, though not
mentioned in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial).
27. However, under the Eleventh Amendment, an unconsenting state is
afforded immunity from suits in federal courts. See Querm v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979).
28. State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002).
These fundamental rights do not exist just for the benefit of individuals
who have disputes, but for the benefit of all of us. The constitutional
rights to open courts and jury trial serve to sustain the existence of a core
social institution and mechanism upon which, it may be said without
undue grandiosity, our way of life itself depends.
Id. at 276.
29. Id.
Our constitutional founders wanted the determinations of what is legally
correct and just in our society, and the enforcement of our criminal and
civil laws—to occur in a system of open, accountable, affordable,
publicly supported, and impartial tribunals—tribunals that involve, in the
case of the jury, members of the general citizenry.
Id.
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The right to litigate must be distinguished from the obligation to
litigate. An aggrieved party, whether an individual or business,
whose interests have been injured has the right but not the obligation
to seek remedies through litigation.30 The legal system rarely
imposes an obligation on aggrieved parties to seek remedies through
litigation. An aggrieved party may abandon legitimate and
meritorious claims and decide not to litigate against the offender.
Further, rational litigants take into account the transaction cost of
litigation and may not pursue a claim if the cost of litigation exceeds
the expected benefit.31
While an aggrieved party has no obligation to litigate, the
defendant against whom the claim is filed incurs an obligation to
defend the civil action. A defendant who does not respond to the
civil action runs the risk of facing a default judgment. Even in
frivolous and meritless cases, the defendant must litigate to defeat
the civil action.32 While a plaintiff is free to walk away from
litigation, the defendant cannot do so. In more complex cases where
claims are intertwined with counterclaims, a party’s right to litigate
is also intertwined with the party’s obligation to litigate.
The right to litigation levies a financial burden on taxpayers. The
state maintains court buildings, pays salaries to judges and staff, and
incurs numerous other costs associated with the civil justice system.
Parties litigating a civil dispute pay court fees, but these are rarely
sufficient to cover the state expenses of litigation.33 For the most
30. Institutional plaintiffs, such as corporations, may have structural
constraints emanating from their charter of organization to pursue legal remedies
in certain cases. Organized businesses, therefore, may not have the complete
internal freedom to abandon the right to litigation. Individuals, however, enjoy
more freedom not to exercise the right to litigation.
31. Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 94−95
(2007) (stating that a patentee, for example, might not sue for patent infringement
because of the prohibitive cost of litigation, running at $2 million per side).
32. In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), Justice Scalia
made an interesting commentary on this question:
The books are full of procedural rules that place the perjurer (initially, at
least) in a better position than the truthful litigant who makes no response
at all. A defendant who fails to answer a complaint will, on motion, suffer a
default judgment that a deceitful response could have avoided. A defendant
whose answer fails to contest critical averments in the complaint will, on
motion, suffer a judgment on the pleadings that untruthful denials could
have avoided . . . . And a defendant who fails to submit affidavits creating a
genuine issue of fact in response to a motion for summary judgment will
suffer a dismissal that false affidavits could have avoided. In all of those
cases . . . perjury may purchase the defendant a chance at the factfinder.
Id. at 521−22 (citations omitted).
33. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional
Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1122−23 (2010) (arguing that court fees should be
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part, taxpayers rather than litigants bear the cost of judicial and
administrative services available for the resolution of civil disputes.
If the law allows litigants to request jury trials, ordinary citizens are
summoned to invest time and suffer opportunity cost to assist in
dispute resolution.34 Thus, a systemic right to litigation imposes
both direct and indirect costs on taxpayers.
Public expenditures on resolution of civil disputes are
indispensable for safeguarding ordered liberty. If legal justice is
unavailable or unaffordable, social order is undermined. The right to
litigation is meaningless without access to courts. Circuit Judge
Diana Wood accurately pointed out that “[i]f courts are unavailable
or unable to function, as was the case following Hurricane Katrina,
little stands between the citizenry and the breakdown of the rule of
law.”35 While litigants normally settle their disputes in the shadow
of the law, the availability of courts makes apparent the coercive
imminence of law. Law without courts may still furnish a normative
framework for litigants to articulate and debate issues leading to
settlement.36 Yet, the availability of courts and the associated public
expense is a steadying element in the maintenance of social order
and subsidization of legal justice.37
The right to litigation, however, safeguards constitutional rights,
including welfare rights.38 The state is under a moral obligation to

increased for foreign litigants accessing U.S. courts to recoup the actual cost of
litigation).
34. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why
the Definition of Systemic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must be
Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 796−97 (2011).
Although courts rarely acknowledge it explicitly, most recognize the jury
system is heavily subsidized by the in-kind contributions of jurors, their
employers, and their communities. Only a small portion of the actual
costs of the jury system are incurred by the courts for administrative
expenses, juror fees, and mileage reimbursement. Lost income—or
alternatively, lost wages paid by employers who compensate employees
while on jury service—averages $100 per day, and a conservative
estimate of lost productivity by employed jurors is $675 per day.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. Diane P. Wood, The Bedrock of Individual Rights in Time of Natural
Disasters, 51 HOW. L. J. 747, 748 (2008).
36. Linda Ross Meyer, Just the Facts?, 106 YALE L. J. 1269, 1293−94
(1997).
37. Nicholas A. Robinson, Ensuring Access to Justice Through
Environmental Courts, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 363, 365−66 (2012) (suggesting
that access to courts for the vindication of environmental rights has attained the
status of customary international law).
38. See David Rudovsky, Civil Rights Litigation: The Current Paradox, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 487 (2003) (explaining that the Pennsylvania University
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spend public monies to subsidize the right to litigation for the poor
and middle classes.39 However, the wealthy can pay to exercise the
right to litigation themselves. There is little moral or pragmatic
justification for spending public funds to support litigation between
wealthy individuals or mega-companies, particularly if litigation
involves disputes of marginal social utility.40 Even in cases where
substantial public interest is at stake, law can simply require that
dispute resolution be open and not confidential. Public disclosure of
a socially crucial case does not further require that public funds be
spent to resolve the dispute.
B. Foregoing Litigation Rights
By choosing arbitration, parties forego several rights
accompanying litigation. For example, arbitration parties surrender
the Seventh Amendment constitutional right to a jury trial because
arbitration is conducted without juries.41 More broadly, parties
surrender the right to access courts. Likewise, parties give up the
right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws because
arbitration does not rigidly subscribe to these constitutional rights.42
Parties also give up the right to discovery under the rules of civil
procedure, the right to properly filtered evidence under the rules of
evidence, and the right to appeal legally erroneous decisions.43 All
of these rights are surrendered to acquire the potential expedition,
efficiency, informality, and finality of the arbitration process.44 This
bargain of swapping litigation rights with arbitration advantages is
defended, if not justified, in the name of freedom of contract.45

symposium on Suing the Government highlighted that access to courts is critical
for vindicating constitutional and other rights, including welfare rights).
39. Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717 (2010)
(proposing an attorney’s fee shifting system under which the poor can successfully
assert their rights).
40. Commentators highlight the cost of litigation and its differential impact of
the rich and the poor. See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and
Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 162−63
(1999) (stating that overly permissive discovery rules favor the wealthy and
disfavor the poor).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
42. See Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 17 n.1 (Mont. 2002)
(Nelson, J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Some commentators argue that parties should have the freedom of
contract to shape procedural rules in litigation as well. See Michael L. Moffitt,
Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO.
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Further, by choosing arbitration, parties shift the cost of dispute
resolution from taxpayers to themselves. On a shared basis, parties
pay all costs related to arbitration. Parties pay arbitration
organizations, such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
that provide critical services and default rules for the initiation,
continuation, and conclusion of arbitration proceedings.46 Parties
pay arbitrators for their expertise and time in resolving disputes.
Parties pay all other expenses related to renting the place for
arbitration, summoning witnesses, and securing translation services
and the equipment used in presenting evidence, etc. If the award is
voluntarily enforced, parties bear the entire cost of arbitration.47
In employment disputes, however, the autonomy paradigm
requires that employers, and not low-income employees, pay the
entire cost of arbitration. The traditional rule under which both
parties shoulder the cost of litigation need not apply to employment
disputes.48 The low-income employee may surrender the systemic
right to litigation if the employer undertakes the full cost of
arbitration. Otherwise, arbitration would become oppressive as lowincome employees might abandon even meritorious claims to avoid
the cost of arbitration. The purpose of employment arbitration is not
to defeat meritorious claims but to provide an alternative means of
dispute resolution. Employers may offer arbitration as a condition of
employment in that an applicant who does not agree to arbitrate
employment disputes may be denied the job. In such cases, arbitral
autonomy is morally well-founded when low-income employees are
exempt from sharing the cost of arbitration.
In sum, arbitral autonomy recognizes that there exists a right to
litigate civil disputes that parties may forego by means of an

WASH. L. REV. 461, 462−63 (2007) (proposing that conventional procedural rules
should be treated as default rules, rather than as nonnegotiable parameters).
46. Arbitration organizations establish bodies that oversee arbitration awards
and appoint arbitrators. For example, the International Chamber of Commerce has
instituted the International Court of Arbitration. The London Court of
International Arbitration and the International Centre of the American Arbitration
Association discharge similar functions. These entities are not courts; they are
administrative bodies.
47. Arbitration is called private justice partly because parties pay the cost of
dispute resolution through arbitration. If the public judicial system is not used at
all, the entire cost of arbitration is borne by the parties. For cost sharing see
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra note 16,
§ R-5-57.
48. However, parties may equally share the cost of arbitration if the dispute
arises between the company and the chief executive officer or other well-paid
employee. However, equal cost sharing cannot be imposed on clerks, janitors, and
other low-income employees.
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arbitration agreement. When parties choose arbitration, they forfeit
the right to litigation with respect to disputes identified in the
arbitration agreement. Arbitration law will do no jurisprudential
harm, and it will be consistent with the contract theory of arbitration
if it closes all escape routes to litigation for parties who have freely
chosen arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution.
III. ATTRIBUTES OF ARBITRAL AUTONOMY
This Part lays out the attributes of arbitral autonomy. These
attributes, some of which have gradually evolved to become part of
arbitration law, minimize arbitral litigation. The autonomy paradigm
endorses these attributes. However, the paradigm has serious
reservations about the MACs that harm rather than benefit arbitral
autonomy.
First, the most important attribute of arbitral autonomy treats
arbitration parties with equal respect and concern. This attribute
acknowledges that no person can be forced to settle disputes through
arbitration. Parties custom design arbitration by authenticating an
arbitration agreement that incorporates their mutual will. Party
autonomy49 is the source of determining issues to be arbitrated, the
method of selecting the arbitrator, the language in which arbitration
proceedings will be conducted, the place of arbitration, the choice of
law that would govern the resolution of substantive disputes, and
other related matters.50 Equal respect requires that the obligation to
arbitrate be reciprocal in that each arbitration party is similarly
bound to submit identified disputes to arbitration. The autonomy
paradigm rejects asymmetrical arbitration under which one party is
bound to arbitrate but the other is free to litigate the same disputes—
reaffirming the adage: What is good for the goose is good for the
gander.
Second, the autonomy paradigm recognizes the expanding
universe of arbitration beyond the classical contours of business-tobusiness arbitration. Disputes identified in the arbitration agreement
49. See further discussion of party autonomy in Part III.C. See generally
Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2012) (exploring the normative legitimacy of party
autonomy).
50. “Although arbitrators generally enjoy broad powers to resolve disputes,
there are occasions when an arbitrator’s authority may be unclear, in the absence
of express agreement of the parties. For this reason, parties may wish to specify, in
their arbitration agreement, precisely what the arbitrator can and cannot do.”
STEVEN C. BENNETT, ARBITRATION: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS 86 (2002). For
efficiency purposes, arbitration parties may adopt the rules of an arbitration
organization, such as the AAA, that provide the essentials of arbitration.
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need not be international or commercial in nature. Nor is arbitration
limited to contractual transactions. Arbitration is available to settle a
variety of disputes, including the ones arising from torts, labor,
consumer transactions, employment, and antitrust laws. Claims
involving statutory rights are not barred from arbitration. “By
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, [however,] a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”51 The
U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the argument that disputes
involving “the pervasive public interest” are not fit for arbitration.52
The ever-expanding universe of arbitration excludes fewer and
fewer claims from its domain.53
Third, the autonomy paradigm embraces specific performance of
arbitration agreements and, therefore, compels renegade parties to
submit to arbitration.54 It is a fundamental principle of contracts that
parties are free not to enter into a contract, but if they do they are
obligated to perform the contractual obligations.55 The freedom to
enter a contract at will does not include the freedom to revoke the
contract at will. A party breaching the contract is lawfully obliged to
compensate the aggrieved party.56 In arbitration, however, opting
out of the arbitration agreement by paying damages is unavailable.
51. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
52. Id. at 629.
53. See Marmet Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012)
(preempting West Virginia state public policy against pre-dispute arbitration
agreements that apply to claims of personal injury or wrongful death against
nursing homes).
54. Ordinarily, a party may compel arbitration if another party renegades
against the arbitration agreement and files a civil action. If a party files a civil
action and the other party does not compel arbitration, the plaintiff may be held to
have waived the contractual right to arbitration and may be denied the request for
arbitration. Kramer v. Hammond, 943 F.2d 176, 179 (1991). However, the waiver
is far from automatic. The plaintiff does not surrender the contractual right to
arbitration by filing a civil action. The defendant must show some sort of injury or
prejudice for the court to deny plaintiff the exercise of the contractual right to
arbitration. Catherine McGuire & Robert Love, Dispute Resolution Between
Investors and Broker–Dealers in the United States Securities Markets, 14
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 449 (1991) (stating that parties may
approach courts for provisional remedies without waiving the contractual right to
arbitration).
55. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and Reemergence of Legal
Philosophy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1223, 1241−42 (1984) (discussing the consensual
transfer of present or future rights as the basis of contract obligations).
56. The breaching party may have to pay compensatory damages. Other
forms of damages granted are punitive, liquidated, nominal, and restitutionary
damages. See generally L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
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Arbitration agreements warrant specific enforcement;57 damages are
seldom sufficient to opt out of arbitration. Further, arbitration law
does not allow the revocation of arbitration agreements.58
Fourth, the autonomy paradigm does not discriminate between
pre- and post-dispute arbitration agreements, and it enforces both
types of agreements with equal resolve.59 Historically, post-dispute
arbitration has been the most accepted form of arbitration because
parties are fully aware of what is at stake in an existing dispute when
they surrender the right to litigation in favor of arbitration. Over the
centuries, common law courts have had little problem enforcing
post-dispute arbitration agreements. However, common law courts
have been reluctant to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements on
the theory that such agreements ought to be revocable after a dispute
arises if one of the parties no longer believes that arbitration is the
most appropriate method to resolve the dispute.60 The so-called
common law hostility was primarily against pre-dispute arbitration
clauses; it was rarely against post-dispute arbitration agreements.61
Finally, the autonomy paradigm views MACs inserted in
consumer and employment contracts with suspicion. MACs pose
equity threats to the autonomy paradigm.62 The principle that parties
forfeit the right to litigation and willingly opt for arbitration faces
distortion in take-it-or-leave-it bargains under which one party

57. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
451 (1957) (holding that the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes, contained
in a collective bargaining agreement, should be specifically enforced); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the
purpose of FAA was to annul the common law rule against specific enforcement
of arbitration agreements).
58. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(a) (amended 2000). This provision is nonwaivable. Id. § 4(b)(1).
59. Id. § 6(a). See also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987).
60. In the 1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a pre-dispute arbitration
clause regarding a claim under the Securities Act is unenforceable. See Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436−37 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
61. See supra note 8.
62. MACs may be called coercive. However, the word “coercive” seems
forceful to describe mandatory arbitration clauses that businesses and employers
impose on consumers and employees respectively. Ordinarily, the word implies
the use of force or intimidation to obtain compliance. The word coercion as
applied to MACs connotes absence of actual consent, even though formal consent
might be present, such as initialing the arbitration clauses. See Richard M.
Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for
Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1246 (2001).
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commands disproportionate market power in relation to the other.63
MACs are inseparably tied to take-it-or-leave-it bargains. Consumer
and employment arbitration agreements are in most cases coercive
contracts. Businesses selling or leasing goods and services include
binding arbitration as a mandatory condition in sales and lease
contracts. Consumers have the option to turn down the bargain and
refuse to buy or lease goods and services from such businesses. But
if they need to buy goods and services, consumers must submit to
MACs. Likewise, employers may not offer jobs unless applicants
accept mandatory arbitration for resolving employment disputes,
including racial, religious, gender, or other discrimination claims.
Such take-it-or-leave-it bargains distress the contract theory of
arbitration, particularly if consumers and employees have no viable
market option to turn down the bargain. In such cases, to say that
consumers and employees willingly surrender the right to litigation
and voluntarily opt for arbitration is a stretched truth.
In sum, the autonomy paradigm is most suitable for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements free of procedural coercion
and substantive unconscionability. If parties negotiate to surrender
the right to litigation in favor of arbitration and they freely negotiate
the terms of arbitration, they have little excuse to resort to arbitral
litigation. The legal system should disallow any weakening or
undermining of freely negotiated arbitration agreements. The
autonomy paradigm derives its conceptual clarity and moral vigor
from freedom of contract. However, the autonomy paradigm does
not endorse MACs that embody substantive unfairness. Foreclosing
judicial scrutiny of MACs can entrench market abuse and
exploitation of the weak and the vulnerable. This point is further
discussed in Part VIII in the context of arbitration blackout.
IV. AUTONOMY AND ARBITRABILITY
This Part explains the relationship between arbitral autonomy and
arbitrability. For the most part, arbitral autonomy is compatible with
the concept of “arbitrability,” a permanent feature of arbitration law
that excludes certain disputes from the scope of arbitration. Nonarbitrability limits arbitration by the very fact that non-arbitrable
disputes are reserved for litigation. Arbitral autonomy is relevant only
if disputes are arbitrable and have been submitted to arbitration. The
distinction is clear: autonomy suppresses arbitral litigation whereas
non-arbitrability suppresses arbitration itself. Historically, arbitration
63. David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (2011)
(commenting on the popular jurisprudential postulate that arbitration is based on
consent, not coercion).
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has been a favored method for settling commercial disputes while
non-commercial disputes were reserved for litigation. In the past few
decades, legislatures and courts have been exceedingly open to
arbitration, and the historically limited scope of arbitration has
substantially expanded, reaching employment, consumer, and
antitrust matters. Fewer and fewer areas of law, civil disputes, and
specific issues are non-arbitrable. As non-arbitrability shrinks in
scope, the autonomy paradigm becomes more and more valuable.
For analytical purposes, non-arbitrability may be divided into
two distinct categories: state non-arbitrability and party nonarbitrability. As discussed below, the autonomy paradigm raises
different issues with respect to these categories. As a general
principle, with only a few caveats, the autonomy paradigm respects
state non-arbitrability that excludes certain matters from arbitration;
it similarly respects party non-arbitrability in that arbitration parties
may freely identify issues they would submit to arbitration and
reserve others for litigation.
A. State Non-arbitrability
“State non-arbitrability” refers to laws and policies that a state
may adopt to exclude designated matters from the scope of
arbitration. “State arbitral paternalism” is a jurisprudential construct
to defend state-initiated non-arbitrability. State arbitral paternalism
disallows arbitration, preserves the right to litigation, and
consequently guides persons to litigate rather than arbitrate certain
disputes.64 For example, the state has a monopoly over the
dissolution of marriage.65 Even though parties may negotiate marital
property settlement and child custody issues, the dissolution of
64. For example, in the past few years, the controversy over faith-based
arbitrations has stirred legal and political circles. The Sharia-based arbitration
intensifies Islamophobia and some legitimate concerns with respect to Western
values of female equality. See Jean-Francoise Gaudreault-Desbiens, Constitutional
Values, Faith-Based Arbitrations, and the Limits Private Justice in a Multicultural
Society, 19 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 155 (2005); see also Liaquat Ali Khan, Kansas
Legislature Does Harm in Barring Islamic Law, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 15,
2012, 12:05 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/liaquat-ali-khan/kansas-sharia-law_b
_1518144.html.
65. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (“[W]e know of no
instance where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate
themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and
more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the
State’s judicial machinery.”). States also exercise control over the formation of
marriage; marriage regulations vary from state to state. See generally Adam
Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
735 (2011).
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marriage itself is non-arbitrable, and only courts are empowered to
dissolve marriages. In addition, the court is not bound to accept a
negotiated settlement, even though most courts defer to the parties.
The parental abuse of children also warrants state paternalism.66 The
state monopoly over dissolution of marriages to the exclusion of
arbitration may be judicious for the protection of children’s rights.67
As a jurisprudential construct, state arbitral paternalism plays a
beneficial role in protecting the community’s weak and vulnerable
sections. In preserving social order, economic justice, or elements of
fairness, the state may exclude certain legal matters from the private
justice of arbitration and retain them in the public realm of state
courts. In modern societies, state arbitral paternalism does not
emanate from the will of a “philosopher–judge”68 who might see the
ills of arbitration that no one else does. State choices of nonarbitrability are frequently democratic choices, made after due
debate and deliberations in elected chambers and legislated in state
statutes. To declare all such democratic choices in determining the
scope of arbitration as “hostility to arbitration” is analytically
inaccurate and indefensible.69
State non-arbitrability, however, is undergoing serious judicial
deconstruction and dismantlement. The state power to freely declare
non-arbitrability in certain areas of law has been challenged through
the constitutional doctrine of preemption.70 Both Congress and
federal courts have flattened the fortress of state non-arbitrability. If
parties opt for arbitration but the state mandates litigation, federal
66. For example, the state as parens patriae protects children from neglectful
parents. However, excessive state paternalism over family matters could harm
rather than protect children. Coyla J. O’Connor, Childhood Obesity and State
Intervention: A Call to Order!, 38 STETSON L. REV. 131, 146 (2008).
67. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate:
An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 500
(1981) (arguing that arbitration resolves competing interests of parties (parents)
and because the child is not an arbitration party, the child’s welfare may not be
fully represented or protected in the arbitration proceedings). But see Lawrence S.
Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal
Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198 (1964) (arguing that a legal instrument like
arbitration is suitable for disputes involving child welfare).
68. Dean Norman Redlich, with whom the author studied a course in Legal
Education, offered the phrase “philosopher–judge” to describe Judge Edward
Winfield. See Norman Redlich, Judge Edward Winfield, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 927,
928 (1987).
69. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (protesting that an expanding scope of FAA will
displace state statutes designed to protect consumers).
70. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND.
L.J. 393, 409 (2004) (discussing the preemption of state laws that impede the
enforcement of arbitration clauses).
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courts side with the parties and not the state.71 As a broad principle,
the contractual right to arbitration trumps state non-arbitrability.
By enacting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925,
Congress set in motion a process of undermining state nonarbitrability.72 The FAA protects the specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements.73 Courts have employed the FAA to strike
down state statutes that collide with the specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements.74 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, in
enacting the FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring
arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties agreed
to resolve by arbitration.”75 In conflicts over arbitrability between a
state statute and an arbitration agreement, federal courts enforce the
arbitration agreement and not the state statute.76 Even when state
courts favor non-arbitrability, federal courts rely on the FAA to
overrule state courts and support the specific enforcement of
arbitration agreements.77
Consider a state non-arbitrability statute. The California
Franchise Investment Law provides: “Any condition, stipulation or
provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to
waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order
hereunder is void.”78 In reading this provision, the California
Supreme Court ruled that claims asserted under the Franchise
Investment Law are non-arbitrable.79 In others words, parties to a
franchise agreement cannot surrender their right to litigation in favor
of arbitration. Parties must litigate and find judicial solutions to
issues arising under the Franchise Law. The U.S. Supreme Court
struck down California’s non-arbitrability statute as an unlawful
71. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490−91 (1987).
72. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
73. Id. §§ 9–11. The reluctant party that agreed to arbitrate can be compelled
to abide by the agreement.
74. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (preempting the
Montana statute that makes arbitration agreements unenforceable unless the notice
that the contract was subject to arbitration was underlined in capital letters on the
first page of the contract).
75. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
76. Marmet Healthcare Ctr. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (holding that
FAA preempts West Virginia statute that excludes from arbitrability pre-dispute
arbitration clauses for claims involving injury and wrongful death caused by
negligence in nursing homes); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (holding that
FAA preempts state-law requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for
wage disputes).
77. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
78. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 2011).
79. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982).
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barrier to the scope of arbitration.80 It preempted the statute and
upheld the freedom of parties to arbitrate franchise disputes.81
Under the evolving law of arbitrability, private contracts can
preempt state statutes that bar arbitration. Parties may use an
arbitration agreement to defeat state non-arbitrability. If a certain
matter is non-arbitrable under state law, parties may nonetheless
agree to submit such non-arbitrable matter to arbitration. They count
on the FAA’s supportive role to defeat the state barrier. That
arbitration parties may use the power of contract to defeat state nonarbitrability is a remarkable triumph of private law over legislative
policies.
It is unclear, however, whether federal courts would remove
every conceivable state arbitral barrier under the preemption
doctrine. Parties take some risk when they defy state nonarbitrability laws and agree to submit matters to arbitration. In most
cases, state non-arbitrability is a non-issue if both parties are
committed to arbitration. State non-arbitrability becomes an issue
only when a renegade party challenges the arbitration agreement on
the basis of a state statute prohibiting arbitration. In such cases,
federal courts are disinclined to rescue the renegade party; they
uphold the arbitration agreement and not the state barrier.
The autonomy paradigm does not advocate that all state barriers
to arbitration be completely removed. As noted before, the
autonomy paradigm aims to eliminate arbitral litigation; it does not
prefer arbitration over litigation. The state may have weighty policy
considerations in excluding certain legal matters from the scope of
arbitration. Some such barriers may survive the law of preemption.
The autonomy paradigm respects the law of preemption that
dismantles non-principled state barriers to arbitration, and it also
respects legitimate state concerns for reserving certain matters
exclusively for judicial forums.
In addition to dismantling state non-arbitrability, federal courts
are equally resolved to dismantle federal non-arbitrability. The
Supreme Court has interpreted federal statutes granting the right to
sue to include the option to arbitrate.82 The theory that Congress can
grant a non-waivable right to sue is still good.83 However, unless the
language of the federal statute is crystal clear in excluding
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution, the right to sue is
80. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
81. Id.
82. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
83. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
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interpreted to include the right to arbitration. Even “repeated use of
the terms ‘action,’ ‘class action,’ and ‘court’—terms that . . . call to
mind a judicial proceeding” in a federal statute will not be construed
to conclude that the statute requires litigation and prohibits
arbitration.84 The powerful pro-arbitration trend in federal courts
rarely rules in favor of non-arbitrability.
Should the arbitrator have the preemption power to strike down
a state statute prohibiting arbitration? The autonomy paradigm is
greatly strengthened if arbitrators can lawfully exercise this
preemption power and thereby eliminate the need to go to court. To
understand this proposition, consider the franchise case discussed
above.85 The California statute excludes franchise-related matters
from the scope of arbitration, requiring litigation. Imagine that
parties enter into a franchise agreement that includes an arbitration
clause to settle franchise disputes, ignoring the state statute. When a
dispute arises, one party requests arbitration while the other objects
to arbitration by pleading the state non-arbitrability statute.
If the arbitrator is empowered to decide the non-arbitrability
question, the arbitrator may uphold the California statute and
conclude that the dispute is non-arbitrable. In that case, arbitration
will no longer be available unless the court decides otherwise and
preempts the state non-arbitrability statute. A more serious situation
arises if the arbitrator believes that the California statute is an
unlawful barrier to arbitration. Should the arbitrator be granted the
preemption power to decide that the California statute is an unlawful
barrier to arbitration under the combined impact of party autonomy
and federal law?
The judicial power of preemption is a sensitive constitutional
question impinging upon state sovereignty. Granting the preemption
power to arbitrators is a non-starter because it will invite stiff
opposition from judges, lawmakers, and other legal professionals.
Numerous arguments may be summoned against granting
preemption power to arbitrators. First, because even non-lawyers
can be arbitrators, they might lack the expertise and understanding
of the application of preemption law. Second, arbitrators and judges
might reach conflicting conclusions on preemption, creating
systemic confusion and potentially increasing arbitral litigation.
Third, because arbitration awards cannot be set aside for legal or
interpretive errors, judges would have little power to overrule
erroneous interpretations of preemption law in arbitration circles.
Fourth, constitutional matters, such as preemption, should not be
privatized because no private person ought to have the power to
84. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 670.
85. See supra notes 78–81 and corresponding text.
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nullify a state statute. On the basis of these and other arguments, the
autonomy paradigm does not propose to disturb the exclusive
judicial preemption power to strike down state non-arbitrability
statutes.
B. Party Non-arbitrability
“Party autonomy” empowers arbitration parties to determine the
scope of the arbitration agreement. “Party non-arbitrability” is the
subpart of a broader concept of party autonomy to make and shape
bargains.86 Arbitration law generally respects party autonomy.
“Through their contracts, parties determine the arbitrators’
substantive and procedural powers. Arbitrators who comply with the
resulting substantive and procedural limits demonstrate deference to
the parties and reinforce the parties’ autonomy.”87 Exercising party
autonomy, parties to an arbitration agreement may exclude certain
matters from arbitration.88 The law does not obligate parties to
accept arbitration for all disputes between them. Parties are free to
hybridize dispute resolution by choosing arbitration for some
disputes and reserving litigation for others, a phenomenon that this
Article calls “fractional arbitration.” The mere existence of an
arbitration agreement does not automatically determine that every
dispute between the parties is subject to arbitration.
Arbitral autonomy disapproves of asymmetrical arbitration
agreements that retain the right to litigation for one party but not for
the other. Asymmetrical clauses rarely emanate from genuine party
autonomy. In most cases, the stronger party, such as an employer,
imposes an asymmetrical arbitration obligation on the weaker party,
such as an employee.89 Employment contracts at nonunion

86. In conflict of laws, party autonomy empowers parties “to select the law
governing their contract, subject to certain limitations.” Volt Info. Scis, Inc. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 491 (1989) (quoting
EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER H. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 632–33 (2d ed. 1991)).
Here, the concept of party autonomy is used with a broader meaning to include the
power to make legally enforceable bargains.
87. Julia Rabich, Sarah Stoner & Nancy A. Welsh, Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards and Mediation Agreements: Tips for Sustaining Deference,
67-APR DISP. RESOL. J. 48, 50 (2012).
88. “Party autonomy” refers to issues that arbitration parties decide to submit
to arbitration. It also includes issues that parties reserve for litigation. By contrast,
“autonomous arbitration” minimizes court intervention with respect to issues
submitted to arbitration. Autonomous arbitration has no bearing on issues reserved
for arbitration.
89. “[T]he doctrine of unconscionability limits the extent to which a stronger
party may, through a contract of adhesion, impose the arbitration forum on the
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workplaces may contain arbitration clauses with asymmetrical
obligations. The clause may bind workers but not the employer to
submit employment disputes to arbitration. Under such one-sided
clauses, the employer does not surrender the right to litigation in
favor of arbitration, but the employee does. Courts have refused to
enforce asymmetrical clauses by declaring them unconscionable.90
1. Prohibiting Fractional Arbitration
Ordinarily, parties select arbitration as the exclusive method of
settling all issues arising out of a transaction. A standard arbitration
clause may read as follows: “Any controversy or claim arising out
of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled
by arbitration.”91 This all-inclusive pre-dispute clause submits all
contract controversies and claims to arbitration and reserves nothing
for litigation. A similar all-inclusive pre-dispute agreement may be
drafted to settle non-contractual claims and controversies by
arbitration. Despite this common practice of using all-inclusive
arbitration clauses, arbitration law respects fractional arbitration and
allows parties to reserve some matters for litigation.
Analytically, there are two distinct questions: “(1) whether a
valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the
agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”92 These two questions
constitute party non-arbitrability. The first question identifies
whether parties have selected arbitration as the forum for dispute
resolution. The second question identifies whether the parties have
selected arbitration for less than all disputes and have thus opted for
fractional arbitration. Party non-arbitrability is rarely an issue when
parties submit all disputes to arbitration by means of a valid
arbitration agreement.
Fractional arbitration, though sound under the contract theory of
arbitration, spawns arbitral litigation. When parties establish a
hybrid regime reserving some issues for arbitration and some for
litigation, they invite confusion and conflict. Parties will inevitably
fight over the borderline that separates arbitration issues from
litigation issues. This border dispute is even more troublesome if
issues reserved for litigation arise under the same contract or relate

weaker party without accepting that forum for itself.” Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000).
90. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
91. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra
note 16, § R-34, at 22.
92. Kilgore v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2012).
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to the same transaction. Parties will use courts to delineate the
border that the arbitration agreement might have vaguely drawn.
Because fractional arbitration breeds arbitral litigation, it clashes
with the rationale of the autonomy paradigm.
Arbitral autonomy proposes to prohibit fractional arbitration.
This prohibition makes much more sense with respect to pre-dispute
arbitration agreements when the nature and scope of future disputes
is unknown. Parties are most likely to disagree over the scope of a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement because parties may see arbitration
differently when a specific dispute arises. (A post-dispute arbitration
agreement under which a particular dispute is submitted to
arbitration does not fall under the concept of fractional arbitration.)
Arbitration institutions may fashion rules to curb pre-dispute
fractional arbitration. They already do by proposing broad,
comprehensive pre-dispute arbitration clauses. The courts may also
refuse to fine comb an arbitration agreement to determine whether a
dispute is excluded from arbitration.93
2. Arbitrating Fractional Arbitration
Until the law prohibits fractional arbitration, the autonomy
paradigm supports allowing the arbitrator to decide disputes
involving party non-arbitrability. While state non-arbitrability
barriers to arbitration may be reserved exclusively for courts, party
arbitral choices should be subjected to arbitration. In fractional
arbitration, if both parties agree that a certain dispute should not be
submitted to arbitration and must be litigated, the autonomy
paradigm is not in question. If parties disagree over whether a
dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement, a scenario
that usually occurs after a dispute has arisen, the road to arbitration
is no longer clear. If parties agree that the issue of party nonarbitrability may be submitted to arbitration, they may do so and
thus preserve the autonomy of arbitration. If parties disagree over
the party non-arbitrability of an issue and one party calls for
arbitration and the other for litigation, the deadlock invites arbitral
litigation and consequently threatens the autonomy paradigm.
To resolve such deadlocks arising from fractional arbitration
agreements, the autonomy paradigm confers upon the arbitrator the
93. “Where the arbitration clause is broad, only an express provision
excluding a specific dispute, or ‘the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration,’ will remove the dispute from consideration by
the arbitrators.” Highlands Wellmont Health Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health
Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting AT & T Technologies, Inc.
v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986)).
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inherent power to decide whether a particular controversy is
arbitrable under the arbitration agreement.94 The arbitrator’s power
to decide fractional arbitration controversies would eliminate the
need for the parties to go to court. A fractional arbitration agreement
is essentially a contract that does not raise intricate constitutional or
statutory questions. Reserving fractional arbitration questions for
arbitrators promotes efficiency of dispute resolution. It makes little
sense to reserve fractional arbitration disputes exclusively for courts
because, in that case, parties will be forced to litigate such disputes,
a consequence leading to arbitral litigation that the autonomy
paradigm strives to eliminate.
The contract theory of arbitration may be invoked to argue that
fractional arbitration disputes must be litigated in courts.
Conceptually, arbitration occurs because parties have voluntarily
agreed to submit disputes to arbitration. If a certain dispute falls
within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the renegade party
may be compelled to arbitrate because such compulsion is consistent
with specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. However, if a
party has not agreed to submit a specific dispute to arbitration, the
law cannot compel the party to arbitrate that specific dispute. A
party contesting the arbitrability of a specific dispute is not a
renegade party but instead a non-party that has not agreed to settle
the specific dispute by arbitration. On the basis of this contractbased logic, a party contesting fractional arbitrability makes a
credible claim against what it believes to be coercive arbitration.
Arbitration law offers a multilayered solution. First, it draws a
distinction between procedural and substantive arbitrability. The
arbitrator has the power to decide issues of procedural arbitrability,
what arbitration law calls “a condition precedent to arbitrability,”95
such as time limits, laches, notice, estoppel, and other objections to
the maintenance of a claim. Substantive arbitrability is indeed
another name for fractional arbitration. With respect to fractional
arbitration, that is, whether a dispute is encompassed by an
agreement to arbitrate, arbitration law provides that the court shall
decide such a controversy.96 The Supreme Court has upheld the
judicialization of fractional arbitration.97 This solution is consistent

94. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that parties may arbitrate the
“‘gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to
arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.” Rent-ACenter, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777 (2010).
95. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(c) (amended 2000).
96. Id. § 6(b).
97. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
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with the contract theory of arbitration that forbids coercive
arbitration.98
The judicialization of fractional arbitration, however, is not a
mandatory rule. It is a default rule that parties may alter to preserve
arbitral autonomy.99 The parties may include a specific clause in the
arbitration agreement empowering the arbitrator to decide the
questions of party non-arbitrability. Some arbitration organizations,
including the AAA, provide rules under which the arbitrator can
decide the questions of party non-arbitrability.100 By adopting such
institutional rules, parties effectively opt out of the existing default
rule. The courts have upheld institutional rules that empower the
arbitrator to decide the questions of party non-arbitrability.101
To keep fractional arbitration out of courts, the autonomy
paradigm proposes that arbitration law should be amended to
empower the arbitrator to decide questions of party non-arbitrability.
There are different ways to amend the law. First, the law can be
amended to switch the default decision maker from judges to
arbitrators. Under the new default rule, parties may choose a clause
98. However, arbitration proceedings are not automatically halted if a party
files a civil action to contest fractional substantive arbitrability. The arbitration
proceedings may continue unless the court issues a restraining order or decides
that the controversy is non-arbitrable. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(d) (amended
2000). The arbitrator, however, possesses the discretionary power to halt
arbitration proceedings until the court reaches a decision on fractional arbitration.
Id. cmt 6.
99. Id. § 4(a). This section allows parties to waive the judicialization of
substantive arbitrability.
100. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES, supra note 16, § R-7, at 13.
(a) The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own
jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope
or validity of the arbitration agreement.
(b) The arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or
validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part. Such an
arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the
other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract
is null and void shall not for that reason alone render invalid the
arbitration clause.
(c) A party must object to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator or to the
arbitrability of a claim or counterclaim no later than the filing of the
answering statement to the claim or counterclaim that gives rise to the
objection. The arbitrator may rule on such objections as a preliminary
matter or as part of the final award.
Id.
101. The Daiei Inc. v. U. S. Shoe Corp., 755 F. Supp. 299, 303 (D. Haw. 1991)
(noting that parties incorporated by reference in their arbitration agreement the
rules of the International Chamber of Commerce providing that “any decision as
to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction shall lie with the arbitrator”).
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under which judges resolve the questions of party non-arbitrability.
If parties fail to include such a clause in the arbitration agreement,
the default rule empowers the arbitrator to decide the questions of
party non-arbitrability. Second, the law can be amended to take
courts completely out of party non-arbitrability. Under this option,
the arbitrator will have the exclusive power to decide the questions
of party non-arbitrability. This option is most consistent with the
autonomy paradigm.
V. SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE
The autonomy paradigm supports, but reconfigures, the
severability doctrine under which the arbitration clause is severable
from the remainder of the underlying contract and enforceable even
if the remainder of the contract is unenforceable.102 Federal case law
allows the separation of arbitration clauses “from the contracts in
which they are embedded.”103 If an underlying contract containing
an arbitration clause is allegedly induced by fraud, the renegade
party must separately show that the arbitration clause too is induced
by fraud. If the arbitration clause is free of fraudulent inducement,
yet the underlying bargain was allegedly procured by fraud, the
disputes relating to the fraudulent underlying bargain must be
resolved through arbitration, not litigation.104 Of course, the
severability doctrine is irrelevant to cases where the arbitration
agreement stands alone and is not a part of a larger contract.
Over the decades, courts have struggled with the enforcement of
arbitration clauses embedded in void and voidable contracts.105 This
Article presents two competing models to capture the debate. The
older model, which may be called the “organic model,” considers
the contract as an organic whole. Under this model, the contract
enjoys the unity of existence and enforceability; it is indivisible and
no part of the contract can be enforced if any part is infected with
102. The severability doctrine is not free from academic criticism. Professor
David Horton called the doctrine “the fiction.” See David Horton, The Federal
Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1027, 1033
(2012).
103. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402
(1967).
104. Id. at 406. Because arbitrators are compensated corresponding to the
volume of arbitration they perform, they might have a personal interest in
prolonging the arbitration and holding that the underlying contract is not void. Id.
at 416 (Black, J., dissenting).
105. A “void” contract produces no legal obligation. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1709 (9th ed. 2009). By contrast, a “voidable” contract creates legal
obligation but is subject to rescission. Id. at 109–10. Voidable contracts may be
cured by ratification. Id.
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illegality. The newer model, which may be called the “mechanical
model,” considers the contract as a mechanical assembly of
numerous distinct parts. Under this model, the contract consists of
many parts; ideally, all parts function together for the best
performance of the contract. However, if all parts cannot function
together, good parts may be separated from bad parts. Good parts
are retained even if bad parts will eventually have to be thrown
away.106
When applied to arbitration cases, the organic and mechanical
models yield dramatically opposite outcomes. Under the organic
model, if the underlying contract is void, the arbitration clause
embedded in the contract cannot be enforced. Accordingly, the
parties must litigate their disputes. Under the mechanical model, the
problem-free arbitration clause is enforced even if the underlying
contract is void. This mechanical model, which focuses on the
legality of the arbitration clause separate and free from the
underlying contract of which it is a part, is the conceptual
foundation of the severability doctrine. If the arbitration clause is
itself legally sound, the contractual obligation to arbitrate is
enforced, and parties must contest the legality of the underlying
contract before the arbitrator.
In order to avoid arbitral litigation, the autonomy paradigm
subscribes to the mechanical model and not the organic model. The
U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the mechanical model under the
FAA to liberate arbitration from the doctrinal niceties of state law.107
In enforcing the mechanical model, the Court has declined to
entertain any distinctions between void and voidable contracts.108 In
a rising trend, most states subscribe to the mechanical model even in
purely domestic cases that involve no interstate commerce.109 A few
states, however, have refused to follow the mechanical model in
cases subject to the state arbitration statute.110 Accordingly, the
106. Emile Durkheim, the French sociologist, uses organic and mechanical
metaphors in his famous book, The Division of Labor in Society. See EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., The Free
Press 1997) (1893).
107. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404.
108. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006).
109. The severability doctrine originated in the jurisprudence of New York
courts and was initially contested in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pinze v. Jones,
345 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1976) (favoring severability of the arbitration agreement
from the underlying contract); see also Weinrott v. Carp, 298 N.E.2d 42 (N.Y.
1973) (showing how New York shifted from nonseverability approach to
severability doctrine).
110. See, e.g., Juan Ramirez, Jr., Arbitrations in Florida: A Tale of Two
Courts, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 43 (2012) (explaining how state courts are
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organic model has not been completely discarded even though the
mechanical model dominates federal and state courts.
In embracing the mechanical model, the autonomy paradigm
views a large contract as a series of micro-bargains.111 Specifically,
the autonomy paradigm views the choice of arbitration as a distinct
micro-bargain between the parties. If some micro-bargains in the
contract are legally unenforceable, a legally sound arbitration
bargain need not be thrown away. Enforcing the arbitration microbargain under the mechanical model allows arbitration to proceed
even if the entire underlying bargain is allegedly fraudulent or
unconscionable.
The mechanical model, however, cannot answer the question of
whether the arbitrator or the court should have the initial authority to
separate and enforce the arbitration clause. If only a court can
separate and enforce the arbitration clause, arbitral litigation is
inevitable, and consequently arbitral autonomy is punctured. If the
arbitrator has the primary power to separate and enforce the
arbitration clause, the parties need not go to court. 112
In upholding the autonomy paradigm, the Supreme Court has
ruled that “unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the
issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the
first instance.”113 The Court declined to confine its rulings to
contracts contested in federal courts. The Court declared that
“regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state
court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not
specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.”114
This ruling, however, does not answer the more complicated
question involving arbitration clauses. The following discussion
grapples with the bifurcated issue of the existence and enforceability
of an arbitration agreement.

pushing back on the severability doctrine in cases where parties have unequal
bargaining power).
111. See G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887,
940−41 (2000) (applying the idea of “series of bargains” to explain the concept of
the firm).
112. See Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What if the
Bellwether Cases Were Decided by a Truly Conservative Court?, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 883, 889 (2012).
113. Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 445–46.
114. Id. at 449.
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A. Existence and Enforceability
The mechanical model can separate an arbitration clause from
the underlying contract, but it cannot sort out conceptual disputes
buried within the arbitration clause. For example, arbitration law
maintains a conceptual border between existence and enforceability
of an arbitration agreement. However, the mechanical model cannot
safeguard this elusive border; hence arbitral litigation is inevitable.
Under current law, parties must fight in court to determine if the
arbitration agreement exists because the law empowers the court to
decide “whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.”115 By exclusion,
the arbitrator has no inherent power to decide whether an agreement
to arbitrate exists. This exclusion, under which no arbitration can
take place without the existence of an arbitration agreement,
comports with the contract theory of arbitration. Courts refer to this
judicial determination as a “gateway matter.”116 If the court decides
that the arbitration agreement exists, parties are then placed under a
legal obligation to engage in arbitration to settle enforceability
issues. Consequently, questions of the arbitration agreement’s
existence are allocated to courts, while questions of its
enforceability are allocated to arbitrators.117
The conceptual border between existence and enforceability of
an arbitration agreement is problematic and elusive. Problems arise
because courts are unsure of whether to fuse the formation of an
arbitration agreement with its fairness. Ordinarily, courts undertake
to analyze the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and not
merely the existence of an arbitration agreement.118 When existence
and validity are fused, judicial approaches are likely to pursue
divergent paths. For example, a party asserting that an arbitration
agreement is unconscionable admits existence of the agreement.
Likewise, a party claiming that the arbitration agreement contains
ambiguities regarding the award of attorney’s fees is nonetheless

115. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6(b) (amended 2000).
116. Davis v. KB Home of S.C., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 799, 804 (S.C. Ct. App.
2011).
117. The FAA provides: “The court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4
(2006).
118. Arbitration law empowers the arbitrator to decide “whether a contract
containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.” UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT
§ 6(c) (amended 2000). Accordingly, the courts must decide whether a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists.
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admitting existence of the arbitration agreement.119 Some judges
would not only consider whether the agreement is free of formation
flaws, such as coercion, they would also consider whether the
agreement is valid in light of defenses, such as unconscionability.120
Others will focus only on formational validity and decline to
consider fairness defenses to the arbitration agreement.121 This
divergence spawns arbitral litigation.
The autonomy paradigm offers two ways to place both existence
and enforceability issues within the jurisdiction of arbitration. First,
exercising party autonomy, parties may specifically waive the
bifurcated stratagem in the arbitration agreement and authorize the
arbitrator to decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.122
Arbitration law does not prohibit such a waiver.123 Some arbitration
organizations furnish rules to confer on the arbitrator the power to
decide “the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration
agreement”124 making it unnecessary for parties to specifically
waive the bifurcated stratagem. By incorporating institutional rules
in the arbitration agreement, parties empower the arbitrator to decide
all issues related to existence and enforceability of the arbitration
agreement.
Second, arbitration law may be amended to construct a new
gateway rule. Under the new gateway rule, unless parties otherwise
agree, the arbitrator, and not the court, will have the primary power
to decide both existence and enforceability issues.125 If the arbitrator
decides that the arbitration agreement exists and is enforceable, the
need for arbitral litigation is minimized. If the arbitrator decides that
the arbitration agreement does not exist or is unenforceable, parties
are free to litigate disputes in the court without any further
arbitration proceedings. The new gateway rule, though it supports
the autonomy paradigm, contaminates the purity of the contract
theory of arbitration to the extent that there would be cases in which
arbitration proceedings would be initiated without the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement. The law might be willing to pay this
119. See Quilloin v. Tenet Healthsystem Phila., Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 231 (3d
Cir. 2012).
120. See Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 269 P.3d 914 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2011).
121. Id. at 923 (Wechsler, J., dissenting).
122. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 4 (a) (amended 2000).
123. Id. § 4(b).
124. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra
note 16, § R-7(a), at 13.
125. Or, the law may simply discard the elusive distinction between existence
and enforceability, merge the two concepts, and authorize the arbitrator to declare
whether the arbitration agreement is binding.
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minor price in compromising the contract theory of arbitration to
reap the tangible benefits of arbitral autonomy.
In sum, the autonomy paradigm endorses the severability
doctrine to enforce a valid arbitration clause even if the rest of the
contract is allegedly voidable or void. The arbitrator should decide
voidability disputes arising from the underlying contract. Further,
the autonomy paradigm proposes to fuse the existence and
enforceability issues, empowering the arbitrator to decide whether
an arbitration agreement exists and is enforceable. This fusion will
minimize litigation.
B. Revisiting Volt
The contract theory of arbitration needs another minor
adjustment to promote the autonomy paradigm. The autonomy
paradigm proposes that the choice of law contained in a contract
should not be used to defeat the arbitration clause embedded in the
same contract if the two clauses are irreconcilable. The conflict
arises when the arbitration clause mandates that parties arbitrate a
dispute while the choice-of-law clause permits the parties to litigate
the same dispute. If the two clauses are incompatible, the autonomy
paradigm proposes to enforce the arbitration clause, denying the
renegade party the choice to litigate. This proposal, however, would
require that the U.S. Supreme Court revisit Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University.126
In Volt, the parties included a pre-dispute arbitration clause in
their underlying construction contract, which mandated that all
disputes “arising out of or relating to this contract” be submitted to
arbitration.127 The choice-of-law clause embedded in the form
construction contract opted for the laws of the place of the
construction project. When a dispute arose, Stanford, a party to the
construction contract, sued Volt, the contractor, in a California
court. Stanford joined two other defendants who were not bound by
the arbitration agreement. Stanford, the renegade party, relied on the
choice-of-law clause to resort to litigation instead of arbitration.
Because the project was located in California, the choice-of-law
clause triggered the application of the California Civil Procedure
Code provision that “permits a court to stay arbitration pending
resolution of related litigation between a party to the arbitration
126. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468 (1989).
127. Id. at 470.
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agreement and third parties not bound by it.”128 Suspending
arbitration is viewed necessary because simultaneous arbitration and
litigation raise the “possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact.”129 Invoking the arbitration clause, Volt
demanded arbitration.
In view of the incompatibility between the arbitration clause and
the choice-of-law clause, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the choiceof-law clause to allow litigation and denied Volt’s motion to compel
arbitration. The Court reasoned that arbitration parties are free to
custom design the arbitration clause and may embrace state (civil
procedure) barriers to arbitration through the choice-of-law clause.
By specifying the laws of California as the governing law of the
contract, the Court held that the parties incorporated the rules of the
California Civil Procedure Code into the arbitration clause.
The Court relied on the contract theory of arbitration to interpret
the scope of an arbitration agreement.130 The contract theory of
arbitration would allow parties to embrace any arbitration barriers
that a state, such as California, allows. That, however, was not the
critical question in Volt. The critical question involved a conflict
analysis between the arbitration clause and the choice-of-law clause.
These clauses led in different directions: one toward arbitration, the
other toward litigation. The Court did not consider, let alone resolve,
the conflicting clauses. By contrast, the dissenting Justices provided
a piercing analysis of choice-of-law clauses in general and rightfully
concluded that the parties in Volt did not intend to defeat the
arbitration clause with a generic, non-state-specific, choice-of-law
clause preprinted in a form contract.131
It is common in domestic and international transactions for
parties to adopt two clauses in an underlying contract: By choosing
the choice-of-law and the choice-of-forum clauses, parties take
control of dispute resolution. By adopting these clauses, parties wish
to avoid the cost and uncertainty associated with the conflict-of-laws
litigation. The autonomy paradigm enforces both clauses because
the purpose of the arbitration clause is to provide the forum, whereas
the purpose of the choice-of-law clause is to identify the law that
would govern resolution of disputes. Arbitration parties rarely intend
that the choice-of-law clause nullify the choice-of-forum clause. The
conflict between the two clauses arises because parties (and their
lawyers) cannot see all possible consequences flowing from the
confluence of the two clauses. Most importantly, the choice-of128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 488−91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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arbitration clause is much more specific and purposeful than the
choice-of-law clause that potentially covers scores of statutes and
hundreds of cases that may come to bear on substantive dispute
resolution.132
If choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses conflict, courts
need not reward the renegade party who wishes to litigate after a
dispute has arisen, even though it has specifically agreed to arbitrate.
Sheltering the renegade party under the choice-of-law clause
weakens arbitral autonomy and opens yet another escape route from
arbitration to litigation. The autonomy paradigm, therefore, proposes
that Volt be revisited and confined to its facts involving nonarbitration parties. As a general principle, the autonomy paradigm
proposes that in cases of incompatibility, the choice-of-law clause
should not be allowed to defeat the arbitration clause.
VI. PARITY PRINCIPLE
In granting case management powers necessary to successfully
conduct and conclude arbitration proceedings, the autonomy
paradigm proposes a “parity principle” under which the arbitrator
wields powers in parity with the trial court.133 The “parity principle”
is a principle of powers granted to the arbitrator; its purpose is not to
turn arbitration into a mirror image of litigation as the purpose of
arbitration would be defeated if arbitration mimiced litigation.
Rather, under the parity principle, the arbitrator is granted the same
powers of effective case management and disposal as the trial
court.134 The parity principle is essential to curb arbitral litigation. It
is already recognized in arbitration law to some extent and should be
further strengthened in light of the following analysis.
In understanding the parity principle, one caveat is necessary.
The parity principle does not dictate that the arbitrator follow
procedural and evidentiary rules in the same way and to the same
extent as the trial court. The arbitrator’s procedural powers should
132. “[T]he inclusion in the contract of a general choice-of-law clause does not
require application of state law to arbitrability issues, unless it is clear that the
parties intended state arbitration law to apply on a particular issue.” Doctor’s
Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1997).
133. The U.S. Supreme Court used the parity principle in the context of
banking “to put national banks on the same footing as the banks of the state where
they were located for all the purposes of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States.” Leather Mfrs’ Nat. Bank v. Cooper, 120 U.S. 778, 780 (1887).
134. Currently, arbitration does not fully function under the parity principle.
For example, the arbitrator might not be able to appoint a receiver. Marsch v.
Williams, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “the power to
appoint receivers is unique and cannot be extended to arbitrators in the absence of
legislative action”).
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not be confused with the procedural rules that govern litigation. The
rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence provide a complex
infrastructure to guide litigation. Many of these rules are designed to
conduct jury trials, something that arbitration does not have.135
Parties choose arbitration in part to avoid the procedural and
evidentiary thicket and the attendant cost and delay of litigation.
Parties “trade[] the procedures . . . for the simplicity, informality,
and expedition of arbitration.”136 Arbitration would lose efficacy, if
the arbitrator was obligated to follow procedural and evidentiary
rules in their entirety.137 In conducting arbitration in a manner
“appropriate for a fair and expeditious disposition of the
proceeding,”138the arbitrator enjoys the discretion to select the
appropriate rules of procedure and evidence. The arbitrator may
proactively consult parties before the hearing to determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence.
The arbitrator’s proactive management of evidence with the
assistance of parties is a feature unavailable to judges in litigation.139
A. Preliminary Relief
The autonomy paradigm proposes two distinct sets of procedural
powers for the arbitrator. First, the arbitrator must have the authority
to grant every form of preliminary relief that the trial court may
permit. Second, the arbitrator must be granted the exclusive power
to grant preliminary relief, thus eliminating judicial intrusion at the
initial stages of the arbitration proceedings. The first set of powers
belongs to the parity principle. The second set is designed to further
minimize the need to go to court.
Under the parity principle, the arbitrator, just like the trial judge,
may grant preliminary relief, such as issuing restraining orders;
ordering discovery appropriate for the resolution of the controversy;
issuing subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and for the
135. Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury
Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 444 (1996) (stating that the rules of evidence
were framed to restrict the information available to jurors in rendering verdicts).
136. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985).
137. “The absence of precise procedural rules is commonly regarded as one of
the greatest advantages of arbitration in comparison with the mandatory
procedural rules that govern litigation in national courts.” Giacoma Rojas Elgueta,
Understanding Discovery in International Commercial Arbitration Through
Behavioral Law and Economics: A Journey Inside the Minds of Parties and
Arbitrators, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 165, 174 (2011).
138. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 15(a) (amended 2000).
139. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra
note 16, § R-9, R-21, at 14, 18−19.
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production of documentary and electronic records; and taking action
against a renegade party “to the extent a court could if the
controversy were the subject of a civil action.”140 The arbitrator is
granted these preliminary tools to protect the efficacy and integrity
of the arbitration process, just as the trial court employs these tools
for the efficacy and integrity of a civil action. If these tools were
unavailable to the arbitrator, parties would need to go to court to
obtain a restraining order, effect discovery, and obtain information
pertinent to the case—a consequence that defeats the purpose of
arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution.141
In order to further minimize arbitral litigation, the autonomy
paradigm proposes that the arbitrator should be the sole dispenser of
preliminary relief. If a party is granted the option to go either to the
arbitrator or to the court to seek preliminary relief, there is no
guarantee which the party will choose. The party may approach the
court out of convenience or to stall or undermine the arbitration
proceedings. To minimize arbitral litigation, the option to go to
court to obtain preliminary relief must be taken away. If the
renegade party approaches the court to obtain preliminary relief, the
court should summarily direct the party to seek such relief from the
arbitrator.142
While arbitration law recognizes the arbitrator’s power to grant
preliminary relief, the law does not grant the arbitrator the exclusive
authority to provide preliminary relief. State and federal courts tend
to retain the authority to grant relief even if the arbitration
proceedings are under way and the arbitrator is available to grant the
necessary relief. In a Georgia case, for example, a party presented
the exclusivity argument to the Georgia Supreme Court, contending
that “the parties’ agreement to arbitrate strips this Court of its
equitable powers to enter injunctive relief.”143 The Georgia Supreme
Court rejected the exclusivity argument, reminding the party that the
“overwhelming majority of federal courts . . . have concluded that a
binding arbitration clause does not bar a plaintiff from seeking
emergency injunctive relief or other provisional remedies in
court.”144 Showing annoyance, the Georgia court concluded that the
140. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 17(d) (amended 2000).
141. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra
note 16, § R-34, at 22 (granting the arbitrator the authority to provide interim
relief).
142. The party may even be fined for litigating a dispute that falls under
arbitration. However, this Article does not fully explore this point.
143. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Arbitration at 6, Rose Hall Resort, L.P., v. The Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co. Of Jam.,
Ltd. No. 09A-08656-7, (Super. Ct. Ga. 2009), 2009 WL 7798803.
144. Id. at 7.
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law in this area is so well-developed that the party’s exclusivity
argument that “this Court has no authority to award relief of any
kind borders on the sanctionable.”145
The Georgia court fused (and possibly confused) emergency
relief with preliminary relief, ignoring the distinction between them.
As the discussion in the next Part shows, seeking emergency relief
before an arbitrator has been appointed is distinguishable from
seeking preliminary relief after the arbitrator has been appointed.
The courts need not intervene if the arbitrator is available to grant
preliminary or emergency relief.146
B. Emergency Relief
Even if the law empowers the arbitrator to grant preliminary
relief, a key structural difference between arbitration and litigation
challenges the autonomy paradigm. Courts are perennial institutions
available any time a party needs emergency relief.147 This is not the
case with arbitration. The arbitration panel, consisting of one or
more arbitrators conceived in the arbitration agreement, is
unavailable at the time a dispute arises. Parties frequently provide a
procedure for appointing the arbitrator. For example, they might
subscribe to institutional rules for nominating the arbitrator or
designating an appointing authority who would select the arbitrator.
Regardless of the procedure provided for the appointment of the
arbitrator, the appointment occurs after a dispute has arisen and only
upon the request of a party seeking arbitration. Sometimes, the
selection of the arbitrator takes time. In many cases, therefore, the
arbitrator is unavailable when a dispute arises and emergency relief
is needed.
The temporality gap between the occurrence of a dispute and
appointment of the arbitrator forces the party seeking emergency
relief to go to court. The courts are willing to grant emergency relief
if “necessary to preserve the status quo and the meaningfulness of
the arbitration process.”148 In such cases, a court is not obstructing
145. Id. at 8.
146. Ira M. Schwartz, Interim and Emergency Relief in Arbitration
Proceedings, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 57−58 (noting that some people erroneously
believe that parties cannot obtain interim relief in arbitration).
147. “In important, high-dollar cases, sophisticated parties are sometimes able
to secure temporary relief in court almost immediately, even at night from a judge
at home in his or her pajamas.” Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why
Do Businesses Use (Or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 433, 456 (2010).
148. Toyo Tire Holdings of Ams. Inc. v. Cont’l Tire North Am. Inc., 609 F.3d
975, 981 (2010).
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or preempting arbitration but stepping in to provide conservatory
relief without which arbitration might be undermined. The court
provides emergency relief because there is no arbitrator on board to
do so.
The autonomy paradigm, however, can be preserved by closing
the temporality gap. The parties may construct a mechanism to
obtain emergency relief before the arbitrator is appointed. They may
name the arbitrator to provide emergency relief. Judicial
intervention for emergency relief can be avoided if parties have
engaged institutional arbitration services and subscribed to special
institutional rules that provide relief through the appointment of an
emergency arbitrator.149 In that case, the party approaches the
institution, and not the court, to obtain emergency relief. Many
arbitration organizations require parties to specifically adopt
emergency relief rules.150
If parties wish to preserve the autonomy paradigm, the
arbitration agreement needs to include an effective mechanism by
which an aggrieved party can obtain emergency relief from the
arbitrator. To minimize arbitral litigation, the autonomy paradigm
proposes that arbitration organizations integrate emergency relief
procedures into general institutional rules for arbitration.151
C. Exemplary Relief
The autonomy paradigm proposes that the arbitrator have the
inherent power to grant punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other
exemplary relief in appropriate cases. If the arbitrator is denied the
power to grant these remedies, arbitral litigation is inevitable. Parties
will need to go to court to seek and defend claims of punitive
149. Mark Kantor, Comparing Expedited Emergency Relief under the
AAA/ICDR, ICC and LCIA Arbitration Rules, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 136 (2006).
150. The AAA, for example, requires parties to subscribe to emergency rules,
which are part of the general rules of arbitration. See AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC.,
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (INCLUDING MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION RULES) § R-37 (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa
/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_002008&_afrLoop=19273875
51525279&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=19p48rrgk5_208. A recent case
shows how emergency relief is sought, granted, and contested. Yahoo v.
Microsoft, Dist, No. 13 CV 7237, 2013 WL 5708604 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2013).
151. The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) has adopted emergency
rules for urgent relief before the arbitrator is appointed; and the SCC emergency
rules are integrated into the SCC rules for arbitration. ARBITRATION INST. OF THE
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES APP. II at 23 (2010),
available at http://www.sccinstitute.com/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedoms
regler%20eng%20ARB%20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf.
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damages and attorney’s fees. As noted above, arbitral litigation adds
time and cost inefficiencies to dispute resolution.
Judges use the power to grant punitive damages in select cases
to deter egregious behavior. “Punitive or exemplary damages have
been allowed in cases where the wrong complained of is morally
culpable, or is actuated by evil and reprehensible motives, not only
to punish the defendant but to deter him, as well as others who
might indulge in similar conduct in the future.”152 Even though the
plaintiff receives punitive damages as a windfall, punitive damages
serve the social purpose of deterrence, retribution, and possibly
behavior modification.153 Punitive damages are “a social exemplary
‘remedy’, [and] not a private compensatory remedy.”154 Their
imposition is a quasi-criminal sanction.155
Some courts and commentators argue that arbitrators should not
be granted the power to award punitive damages.156 A New York
law specifically prohibits arbitrators from awarding punitive
damages, even if agreed upon by the parties; the power to award
punitive damages is limited to judicial tribunals.157 These courts and
scholars believe that because punitive damages are unavailable for
mere breach of contract, state-appointed judges are best suited to
determine whether an award of punitive damages would serve the
public purpose. Private judges, such as arbitrators, who are not
representing the state, the people, or the rule of law, are hired to do
justice between the private parties before them; they cannot be
trusted with a punitive power, the sole purpose of which is to guard
the welfare of the state and the people.158
Further, punitive damages granted in litigation are subject to
judicial and appellate review.159 In litigation, juries are empowered
152. Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1961).
153. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).
154. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1976).
155. Fabiano v. Philip Morris, Inc., 862 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008).
156. For a commentary on the evolution of the debate about punitive damages,
see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of
Arbitration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
157. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796.
158. Id. The court summoned theoretical/jurisprudential insights, citing the
work of Hans Kelsen, to argue that the state alone has (and should have) a
monopoly over the exercise of coercive power. Private use of coercion, the court
concluded, is barbaric. Id. at 796−97.
159. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (suggesting that
excessive punitive damages may violate the Due Process Clause). For a discussion
of objections to the granting of punitive damages, see Adam M. Gershowitz, The
Supreme Court’s Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial
Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages
Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249 (2000).
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to award punitive damages. If lay jurors can award punitive
damages, one might argue that arbitrators are frequently more
qualified than lay jurors to understand the rationale and gravity of
punitive damages. However, there is a difference. The trial court and
appellate courts may reject a jury award if the basis or the amount of
punitive damages violates the law. Since judicial review of
arbitration awards is limited, the argument proceeds, punitive
damages arbitral awards may not receive the same systematic
judicial review.160
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that arbitrators are allowed to
award punitive damages in arbitration cases involving interstate
commerce.161 Unless arbitration parties exclude the award of
punitive damages in the arbitration agreement, federal arbitration
law preempts state restrictions on an arbitrator’s power to award
punitive damages.162 This ruling, however, is limited in its
preemptive reach. Parties may still agree to exclude punitive
damages from arbitration awards, and states may choose to prohibit
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages in cases not involving
interstate commerce. States, however, might also allow arbitrators to
grant punitive damages.163
The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) upholds the parity principle
and allows the arbitrator to grant punitive damages and other
exemplary relief if the law would authorize similar damages and
relief involving the same claim in a civil action.164 To construct
further symmetry between litigation and arbitration, the Act requires
that the evidence produced at the arbitration hearing justify the
award of punitive damages and exemplary relief “under the legal
standards otherwise applicable to the claim.”165 This symmetrical
standard allows the arbitrator to grant punitive damages and other
exemplary relief on par with the court. The arbitrator must consider
the legal standards and case law of the relevant jurisdiction and
comply with the choice of law.166
160. Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at 796.
161. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
162. Id. at 59.
163. Gomez v. People’s United Bank, No. 3:10-CV-00904 (CSH), 2012 WL
3854956 (D. Conn. Sept. 5, 2012) (upholding the punitive damages award under
Connecticut’s Unfair Trade Practices Act).
164. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(a) (amended 2000). The Act also allows
the arbitrator to award attorney’s fees. See id. § 21(b).
165. Id. § 21(a).
166. The Supreme Court offers three guideposts in awarding punitive damages:
(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive
damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by
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Although parties may preclude an award of punitive damages by
means of an arbitration agreement, the preclusion raises a red flag.
Punitive damages preclusions are frequently embedded in take-it-orleave-it bargains. In most cases, the weaker party waives punitive
damages to the benefit of the stronger party that is most likely to
engage in misconduct warranting punitive damages. Courts are
reluctant to enforce preclusions on the theory that arbitration is an
alternative forum to litigation established under the parity
principle.167 Consequently, the remedies available in litigation ought
to be available in arbitration. An arbitration agreement is
unconscionable if it precludes an employee from recovering punitive
damages and attorney’s fees in an anti-discrimination claim.168
The parity principle shores up arbitral autonomy. It empowers
the arbitrator to grant preliminary, emergency, and exemplary relief,
just as a judge is empowered to provide such relief in litigation.
Arbitration is unlikely to be a self-sustaining method of dispute
resolution if courts continue to claim a monopoly over the granting
of this critical relief when a dispute is designated for arbitration.
VII. VACATING ARBITRATION AWARDS
The judicial review of arbitration awards poses a systemic threat
to the autonomy paradigm because it leads to inevitable arbitral
litigation. A losing party against whom an arbitration award is
rendered may approach the court to vacate the award or challenge its
enforcement;169 in either case, the autonomy paradigm ceases to
exist. Confirming an award is a pro-arbitration action;170 vacating an

the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574−75 (1996).
167. Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
168. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000).
169. One must distinguish between vacating and non-enforcement. When an
award is vacated, it loses its validity and cannot be enforced. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 105, at 1688. However, the mere non-enforcement of an
award does not vacate the award. For example, if a country refuses to enforce a
foreign award, it is not vacated. The same award may be enforced in another
country.
170. “Confirmation is a summary proceeding that converts a final arbitration
award into a judgment of the court.” See Ministry of Def. & Support for the
Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d
1091, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). Upon confirmation, an award is treated similarly to
a judgment in a civil action and may be similarly enforced. Id.
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award is an anti-arbitration action.171 Vacatur completely nullifies
the time and expense invested in, and the outcome produced by, the
arbitration process. Vacatur returns parties back to square one with
the dispute unresolved. After the vacatur, the parties may attempt to
arbitrate the dispute one more time, settle, or may resort to litigation,
depending on why the award was vacated.
Arbitration law provides a number of grounds upon which a
court may vacate the award. The FAA, the UAA, the New York
Convention,172 the Panama Convention, and other treaties all
provide specific grounds for vacating an award.173 Judges have
added a few more grounds for vacating awards.174 As a general
principle, judges respect arbitral outcomes and do not lightly vacate
arbitration awards. The “‘judicial review of an arbitration award is
extraordinarily narrow’” and “‘exceedingly deferential.’”175
Stringent review standards reduce arbitral litigation surrounding the
enforcement of arbitration awards. Yet the goal of the autonomy
paradigm is to minimize, and possibly eliminate, the need and desire
for judicial review of arbitration awards.

171. The FAA allows three months after the rendering of the award to vacate
an award but reserves a year for seeking court confirmation of the award. 9 U.S.C.
§§ 9, 12 (2006) After the passage of three months, a party defending a motion to
confirm is not allowed to seek vacatur. Taylor v. Nelson, 788 F.2d 220, 225 (4th
Cir. 1986).
172. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention), 330 U. N. Treaty Ser. 38. A full discussion
of the non-enforcement of awards under the Convention is not within the scope of
this Article. The Convention allows non-enforcement of foreign awards; it does
not vacate foreign awards. Id. art. V.
173. There are regional and global treaties that establish bodies for
international arbitration. The Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, commonly known as the “Panama Convention,” is a
regional treaty that provides rules for arbitration in the Americas. The InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration is available at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-35.html. The European Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) is another regional arbitration
treaty. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21,
1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 349. The 1965 Washington Convention is a global treaty that
has instituted the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
which provides arbitration rules for the settlement of disputes between signatory
states and foreign investors. The 1965 Washington Convention is available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf.
174. Manifest disregard of the law, for example, is a prominent judicially
created ground for vacating awards. See discussion infra Part VII.
175. Rain CII Carbon, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 674 F.3d 469, 471−72 (5th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Brook v. Peak Int’l. Ltd., 294 F.3d 668, 672 (5th Cir. 2002)
and Apache Bohai Corp. LDC v. Texaco China BV, 480 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.
2007)).
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The grounds for vacating the award may be grouped into two
distinct categories. First, a lawful arbitration award must preserve
the process integrity of arbitration. The grounds safeguarding the
process integrity of arbitration are nearly universal. Process integrity
mandates that an award be vacated if procured by illegal means,
including corruption and fraud.176 Undue means employed in the
procurement of an award vitiate the integrity of the arbitration
process.177 Likewise, the arbitrator’s misconduct that prejudices the
rights of a party may also compromise the process integrity of
arbitration. If the neutral arbitrator is evidently partial in favor of a
party, the arbitration process loses integrity. Even if the arbitrator is
unbiased, he or she may nonetheless conduct the arbitration hearing
in a manner that substantially prejudices the rights of a party. For
example, the integrity of an arbitration hearing is questionable if the
arbitrator refuses to consider evidence material to the controversy.178
A substantially defective hearing lacks integrity. Non-arbitrability
and blatant violations of law, though substantive questions, may also
undermine the process integrity of arbitration. An award may be
challenged on the ground that the law (including public policy)
forbids the arbitration of claims included in the award or that the
award was rendered in manifest disregard of the law.179
Second, a lawful arbitration award must preserve the contractual
integrity of an arbitration agreement. An award may be vacated if
obtained in violation of the arbitration agreement. “Where
arbitrators act ‘contrary to express contractual provisions,’ they have
exceeded their powers.”180 As discussed before, the right and
176. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23 (amended 2000); 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006);
UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ART. V at 50 (1958), available at http://www.uncitral
.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf [hereinafter New York
Convention].
177. “Undue means” is the employment of immoral behavior to procure an
award. However, meritless arguments made to win an award do not constitute
undue means. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401,
1403−04 (9th Cir. 1992).
178. Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1997).
179. “A court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s award on the basis of a
violation of public policy is a specific application of the more general doctrine,
rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts that violate
law or public policy.” City of Hartford v. Hartford Mun. Emps. Ass’n, 39 A.3d
1146, 1153 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). The New York Convention specifically
provides for the non-enforcement of an award if the “subject matter of the
difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of [the
enforcing] country.” New York Convention, supra note 176, art. V(2)(a), at 50.
180. Apache Bohai Corp., 480 F.3d at 401 (quoting Delta Queen Steamboat
Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng’rs. Beneficial Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 889 F.2d 599, 604 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
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obligation to arbitrate chosen disputes are anchored in the arbitration
contract, a device by which parties surrender the right to litigation in
favor of arbitration.181 The arbitration agreement defines the scope
of arbitration and empowers the arbitrator to render an award.
Logically, therefore, an award cannot be enforced if there was no
agreement to arbitrate. In the absence of a valid arbitration
agreement, the award-holder had no right to arbitration in the first
place.182 Under a similar logic, an award is vacated if the arbitrator
exceeded the powers that the agreement conferred on the arbitrator.
For example, the arbitrator cannot render an enforceable award with
respect to a claim that parties have excluded from the scope of
arbitration.
Note, however, that arbitration law does not require judicial
confirmation or review of arbitration awards. If an award is accepted
and voluntarily enforced, no judicial confirmation is needed, and the
autonomy paradigm remains intact.183 However, a party seeks court
confirmation of an award only when the award is likely to remain
unsatisfied. Likewise, an unhappy losing party may not comply with
the award and seek judicial review for its vacatur.
The availability of judicial review of arbitral awards cannot be
abandoned to fortify the autonomy paradigm. However, the
autonomy paradigm can be preserved by shifting the award review
from courts to arbitration organizations. Already, arbitration
organizations provide appellate award review on the same grounds
available to courts.184 Once the parties have used the organizational
appellate review of an award, any further review by a court should
be foreclosed. This foreclosure is necessary to deter parties from
seeking court intervention after the organizational appellate review
is complete; otherwise, the organizational appellate review will turn
into an additional, and perhaps unnecessary, layer in the
enforcement of awards.

181. See supra Part II.
182. However, this ground is unavailable if the party denying the arbitration
agreement does not object to the arbitration proceeding in a timely fashion. UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a)(5) (amended 2000).
183. However, if the losing party does not accept the award or refuses to
comply, the arbitral award needs to be enforced through a court; arbitral awards
are not self-enforcing. See Thomas S. Meriwether, Limiting Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act: Striking the Right Balance, 44
HOUS. L. REV. 739, 743−44 (2007).
184. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra
note 16, at 36.
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VIII. ARBITRATION BLACKOUT
Does arbitral autonomy breed a counterculture of quasilawlessness shrouded in secrecy, disregard of the law, preclusions of
remedies, and waivers of rights? The general answer is no. In some
cases, however, arbitral autonomy may lead to a quasi-lawless
blackout. Consider a MAC embedded in a take-it-or-leave-it
bargain. In such a bargain, the weaker party has no negotiating
power to modify any feature of the MAC.185 The MAC might waive
class action, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. The MAC might
further state that arbitration proceedings will be confidential and that
the arbitrator need not render a reasoned award. Added to these
features are the limited statutory grounds available to vacate an
award rendered in secrecy without reasons. Although each provision
of the MAC is lawful, the combined effect of the provisions
produces quasi-lawlessness that hides in the fold of secrecy without
arbitral accountability, systemic deterrence, or meaningful judicial
scrutiny.
The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld take-it-or-leave-it bargains
mandating arbitration as the sole method of dispute resolution
despite a compelling dissenting voice.186 This judicial concession in
favor of MACs must not be construed to conclude that the Court has
also discarded or weakened the doctrine of unconscionability. State
and federal courts analyze MACs in terms of unconscionability.187
They administer a two-tier analysis.188 First, they determine whether
an arbitration contract is procedurally unfair.189 Second, they
determine whether the substantive bargain of the arbitration contract
is unfair.190 The courts hold arbitration contracts unconscionable
only if the combined procedural and substantive unfairness is
oppressive.191 Under this analysis, take-it-or-leave-it arbitration
clauses are procedurally unfair because one party imposes
arbitration on the other.192 However, the court would find no
185. See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of
Power in Legal Relations (With Special Application to Unconscionability and
Arbitration), 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67, 120−122 (1997) for an explanation of
power relation in unconscionable bargains.
186. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 676 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2012).
188. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669,
690 (Cal. 2000) (analyzing unconscionability in terms of procedural and
substantive portions).
189. See, e.g., id.
190. See, e.g., id.
191. See, e.g., id. at 689.
192. See id. at 690–92.
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unconscionability if the terms of the arbitration are fair. In
procedurally coercive arbitration contracts, therefore, the critical
question is to assess the substantive fairness of the arbitration terms.
The academic literature is divided over the issue. Some academics
criticize MACs in consumer and employment contracts.193 Others
argue that MACs benefit consumers and employees.194
Another genre of MACs tends to circumvent rights and remedies
available in litigation. For example, an arbitration agreement may
shorten the statute of limitations for filing claims; another may limit
the amount of damages to actual damages for breach of contract;
and yet another may waive federal statutory remedies.195 Such
arbitration agreements are coercive in nature because no rational
party would willingly surrender the rights and remedies available in
litigation. A party with superior bargaining power cannot, therefore,
be allowed to use arbitration autonomy to unfairly tilt the playing
field in its own favor, dramatically reduce its legal obligations, and
deprive the weaker party of the rights and remedies that law
guarantees in a civil action.196
Despite endorsing the lawfulness of MACs, courts are reluctant
to endorse class action waivers. The enforceability of class action
waivers appears to be a special matter that courts mull over with
extensive analytical anguish.197 Courts point out that class action
lawsuits are indispensable for vindicating statutory rights.198 Class
action “is the only economically rational alternative when a large
group of individuals or entities has suffered an alleged wrong, but
the damages due to any single individual or entity are too small to
justify bringing an individual action.”199 Courts do not wish to
completely outlaw class action waivers, but they want to retain the
authority to analyze and rule upon each waiver on its own merit.200
Class action waivers, therefore, will continue to spawn arbitral
litigation.
193. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1283−1316 (2009).
194. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment
Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557,
1578−81 (2005).
195. Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., a Div. of Atl. Richfield Co., 43 F.3d
1244, 1248−49 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding such clauses to be unenforceable), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 907 (1995).
196. This type of arbitration agreement breaches the parity principle discussed
in Part VI of this Article.
197. Compare AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011),
with In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012).
198. In re Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 214.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 219.
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Critics of arbitration highlight points of contrast between
litigation and arbitration.201 Litigation is open and accessible to the
public; arbitration is frequently confidential, and its records are
unavailable to the public. Litigation produces judicial opinions
justifying orders and judgments; arbitration renders standard awards
without supportive rationale. Published judicial opinions make
litigation intellectually transparent; unpublished arbitration awards
make arbitration relatively opaque. Judicialization of dispute
resolution generates legal precedents that are binding in similar
cases; arbitration rarely offers or relies on binding precedents. Most
importantly, the law is closely applied in litigation, and appellate
courts overturn lower court judgments resting on violations of law
or abuse of judicial discretion. No such safeguards are available in
arbitration where awards cannot be vacated for erroneous
understandings or interpretations of statutes and cases. Errors of law
may proliferate in an arbitration blackout where arbitrators are not
lawyers.
The arbitration blackout would joyously embrace the arbitral
autonomy presented in this Article, which minimizes court
intervention in arbitration. MACs peppered with preclusion of
remedies and waivers of rights would draw strength from the
autonomy paradigm that restrains court scrutiny. Businesses and
employers, in forcing arbitration on consumers and employees,
would welcome arbitral autonomy that promises even less judicial
oversight than currently available. The autonomy paradigm does not
benefit persons desperately looking for jobs, who have little
negotiating power to modify boilerplate arbitration clauses
embedded in employment contracts. If the autonomy paradigm is a
force of good, it cannot be permitted to favor the powerful and the
privileged and hurt the weak and the vulnerable.202 The following
201. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:
Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1420, 1432 (2008) (noting the opposition of state courts to expanding
arbitration beyond commercial disputes).
202. Professor Thomas Stipanowich proposes the establishment of “The
Arbitration Fairness Index” to promote fair and effective arbitration of
employment and consumer disputes. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration
Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and
Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer
Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985 (2012).
Given the fact that binding arbitration serves as the adjudicative backdrop
for consumer disputes or employer-employee conflict, the choice of
arbitration and the kind of justice available under arbitration agreements
may be every bit as important as consumer warranties and other
substantive rights and remedies set forth in the contract.
Id. at 1069.
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corrective measures are necessary to ensure that arbitral autonomy
does not support an arbitration blackout.
A. Arbitration Secrecy
The arbitration blackout is pro-secrecy. Companies and
employers prefer confidential arbitration. Secrecy allows businesses
to avoid adverse publicity associated with embarrassing
discriminating treatments against which employees seek relief.
Secrecy “diminishes the likelihood that the success of one claim by
a consumer or employee will encourage others like it.”203 Defenders
of arbitration confidentiality, however, point out that even
mediations and negotiated settlements are confidential.204
Arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution might lose
some of its appeal, defenders argue, if arbitration confidentiality is
restricted or outlawed.205 Some scholars distinguish between privacy
and secrecy, though the distinction is elusive;206 but even if there is a
conceptual distinction, arbitration rules may preempt the distinction
requiring that arbitration deliberations be both private and secret.207
Certainly, there are degrees of secrecy, some benign, others
unconscionable. The autonomy paradigm does not protect
unconscionable secrecy that harms the public interest; it allows
confidential arbitration in some but not all cases. The purpose of the
autonomy paradigm is to minimize court intervention and not to
maximize the secrecy of arbitration proceedings. Secrecy is not an
indispensable attribute of arbitral autonomy. If arbitration secrecy is
harmful to the public interest, the autonomy paradigm should

203. Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, The “National Policy” of the
Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L. J. 259, 283 (2003).
204. Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Going Public: Diminishing Privacy in Dispute
Resolution in the Internet Age, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 47 (2002).
205. Id.
206. CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 417−18 (2002) (distinguishing between privacy and confidentiality).
For example, arbitration proceedings are conducted in privacy, but the information
is released after the proceedings are concluded. In such cases, the arbitration
proceedings are private but not secret. It is, however, likely that not all information
is released to the public. Privacy thus acts as a forerunner of secrecy.
207. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS (ARBITRATION
RULES) ART 15 (1), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles
/basicdoc/partF-chap02.htm. “The deliberation of the Tribunal shall take place in
private and remain secret.” Id.
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require that arbitration proceedings be open and arbitration records
and outcomes be made public.208
Arbitration secrecy is unconscionable when it exclusively
benefits one arbitration party and hurts the other. In Ting v. AT&T,
for example, the Consumer Services Agreement (CSA), an adhesion
contract that AT&T offered its customers, restricted numerous rights
and remedies in the event of a dispute with AT&T.209 The CSA
mandated secret arbitration; it banned class actions, and it limited
AT&T’s liability for non-negligence claims to the amount of service
charges and precluded the company’s liability for punitive, reliance,
special, and consequential damages. The CSA reserved benefits for
AT&T and burdened the consumers. In view of this imbalance, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the secrecy
provisions of the CSA were unconscionable.210
The Ting court noted more broadly that secrecy provisions,
though facially neutral, favor companies rather than individuals.211
Companies, as repeat players in arbitration, accumulate a body of
knowledge unavailable to consumer–plaintiffs due to arbitration
secrecy.212 As repeat players, companies master the issues, develop
winning arguments, and know what works, all which is unknown to
new plaintiffs who might request arbitration for similar grievances.
The court noted “the unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent
potential plaintiffs from obtaining the information needed to build a
case of intentional misconduct or unlawful discrimination against
[the company].”213 Thus, secrecy provisions included in arbitration
agreements “gag” critical information from reaching future
plaintiffs, tilting arbitration in favor of companies.214
With respect to secrecy provisions, the autonomy paradigm
proposes the parity principle under which arbitration may be
confidential to the extent a civil action involving the same issues
protects confidentiality. For example, a company may shield trade
secrets from disclosure. The Supreme Court has treated confidential
208. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U.
KAN. L. R. 1211, 1238−40 (2006) (arguing for public disclosure of arbitration
proceedings involving public health, public safety, and other public concerns).
209. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
210. Id. at 1151−52.
211. Id.
212. One court articulated the repeat player effect with the following
observation: “The fact an employer repeatedly appears before the same group of
arbitrators conveys distinct advantages over the individual employee. These
advantages include knowledge of the arbitrators’ temperaments, procedural
preferences, styles and the like . . . .” Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
671, 678−79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
213. Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152.
214. Id.
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business information, including trade secrets, as private property
that cannot be converted into public property through forced
disclosure.215 Likewise, privileged information recognized in civil
actions may be similarly protected in arbitration proceedings.
However, companies cannot use arbitration to shield patterns of
wrongdoing that they cannot protect in litigation. A cloak of
confidentiality in all aspects of arbitration should rarely be available.
B. Quasi-lawlessness
The arbitration blackout nurtures quasi-lawlessness. As noted
earlier, arbitration awards cannot be vacated for erroneous
applications or interpretations of law. Legal error as a ground for
vacatur is not listed in the FAA or the UAA.216 Legal error is
tolerated because arbitrators, while they bring valuable trade-related
expertise to dispute resolution, may not be trained in law or
adjudication. In choosing arbitration, parties risk that the arbitrator
might misunderstand and misinterpret the applicable law. Vacating
awards for legal errors would undermine arbitration as an alternative
method of dispute resolution. The Supreme Court has further
foreclosed legal error as a ground for vacatur, holding that
arbitration parties cannot, by means of a contract, expand the
statutory scope of judicial review to include legal errors.217
Some courts vacate arbitration awards rendered in manifest
disregard of the law, a non-statutory standard of judicial review.218
In 1953, the Supreme Court invented the manifest-disregard-of-law
standard, declaring “that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in
accordance with [the law or] . . . the interpretations of the law by . . .
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the
federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.”219 The
standard opposes the arbitration blackout of rendering legally
vacuous decisions. However, the manifest-disregard-of-law standard
sets a high bar; it “means something more than just an error in the
law or a failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply
215. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
216. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000).
217. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2010).
218. Circuits are split over whether the manifest-disregard-of-law ground is
valid. The Second and Ninth Circuits favor survival. See Comedy Club Inc. v.
Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2008). The Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, however, have held that the doctrine is no longer valid. Frazier v.
CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010); Citigroup Global Markets v.
Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 357 (5th Cir. 2009).
219. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436−37 (1953), overruled on other grounds
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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the law.”220 The standard is met only if the arbitrator understands the
law and yet renders a decision contrary to it. The “manifest” part of
the standard obliges the party challenging the award to show that the
disregard of law is more than mere legal error. In some cases, the
reasoning of the award might itself reveal the manifest disregard of
the law;221 while in other cases, the arbitrator’s conduct during the
arbitration proceedings might evidence the arbitrator’s intentional
dismissal of the law.222
The autonomy paradigm supports manifest disregard of the law
as a valid standard for vacating arbitration awards rendered under
MACs; thus, it suppresses the blackout that enforces the MACs’
arbitration awards regardless of their compliance with the law.223
The MACs’ weaker parties rarely bargain for arbitration to avoid the
applicable law. Almost always, arbitration agreements contain
choice-of-law clauses that govern in resolving substantive issues.224
The standard may or may not be useful in vacating awards related to
freely negotiated arbitration clauses between sophisticated parties.
The manifest-disregard-of-law standard is most beneficial to review
awards rendered under MACs where the weaker party does not
negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement. In MACs, if the
weaker party fails to prevail in arbitration, it needs to know the legal
reasons for the arbitral decision. However, the standard is
meaningful only if arbitrators write reasoned opinions supporting
awards.
C. Reasonless Awards
The arbitration blackout prospers when arbitrators fail to render
reasoned awards.225 Standard arbitration awards are reasonless
awards; they simply announce the result without providing
supportive reasoning.226 Reasonless awards, if made public, have no
220. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir.
1995).
221. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
222. Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 607 F.3d 634, 641
(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d at 832).
223. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that the “manifest disregard” standard survived the decision in Hall
Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582 n.3 (2008), which
declined to decide whether the manifest disregard standard survived it).
224. See, e.g., Lukowski v. Dankert, 515 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1994).
225. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 598 (1960) (holding that arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give
their reasons for an award).
226. Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 844 (11th Cir. 2011).
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informational or precedential value. Arbitration parties themselves
may not know why they have lost or won their competing claims.
An arbitral decision is transparent when it is rendered in writing and
includes supportive reasons. If no reasoning is provided and the
award simply states that, say, the defendant is liable for a certain
amount of money with interest, parties and courts alike cannot
determine which facts, law, or legal analysis the arbitrator relied on
to reach the award.227 This minimalist methodology of rendering
bare awards without giving supportive analysis is in sharp contrast
to adjudication in which judicial decisions furnish the facts,
applicable law, and legal reasoning, including the public policy,
supporting the judgment.
Institutional rules designed for arbitration may or may not
support decisional transparency. Most institutions allow arbitration
parties to opt out of reasoned awards. The AAA arbitration rules do
not require that the arbitrator “render a reasoned award.”228 The
arbitrator can deliver the award in writing but without furnishing the
facts or law or other reasons that support the award. The London
Court of International Arbitration Rules furnish a default rule under
which the arbitrator states the reasons upon which the award is
based.229 However, arbitration parties may change the default rule
by agreeing otherwise in writing.230 The International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) Rules, however, require that the arbitrator state the
reasons upon which the award is based.231 There is nothing in the
ICC rules under which arbitration parties may modify the rule and
opt for an award without supportive analysis.
Unlike judicial opinions, reasoned awards may be written in a
variety of ways.232 A standard judicial opinion contains key facts,
227. Morgan Keegan v. Pessel, No. 11-cv-03293-RPM (D. Colo. May 1, 2012)
(declining to vacate the award), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar
_case?case=106279756669913932&q=morgan+keegan+v.+pessel+2012&hl=en&
as_sdt=2,5.
228. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES, supra
note 16, § R-46(b) at 27. Arbitration parties may change this default rule and agree
to have a reasoned award. They must request a reasoned award in writing prior to
appointment of the arbitrator. The arbitrator has the discretion to deviate from the
default rule if the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is appropriate. Id.
229. ARBITRATION RULES, LONDON COURT OF INT’L ARBITRATION, ART. 26.1,
available at http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/LCIA_Arbitration
_Rules.aspx#article26.
230. Id.
231. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION ART. 31(2),
available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR
/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/.
232. Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 844 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“Logically, the varying forms of awards may be considered along a spectrum of
increasingly reasoned awards, with a standard award requiring the least
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issues, relevant law, legal analysis (parties’ arguments accepted and
parties’ arguments rejected), and the order or judgment. Some
opinions are more elaborate than others. Reasoned arbitration
awards may be written following the format of a standard judicial
opinion.233 Mostly, they are not.234 The amount of explanation
offered in reasoned awards may vary from a short analysis to
detailed “findings of facts and conclusions of law.”235 However,
courts, reluctant to recognize new grounds for vacatur, refuse to
vacate awards merely because the arbitrator’s explanation
supporting the award is substandard.236
The autonomy paradigm embraces the ICC rule that requires
arbitrators to render reasoned awards in cases founded on MACs.
Parties may request that the arbitrator provide the explanation of
facts and law critical to the rendering of the award. 237 The rendered
award, however, may not meet the analytical standards of a good
judicial opinion. The autonomy paradigm, which strives to minimize
court intervention at all stages of arbitration, opposes vacating
awards for inadequate supportive analysis.
What good is the reasoned award, one might ask, if the quality of
supportive analysis is immune from judicial review? Reasoned
awards provide numerous benefits other than the basis for judicial
review. Reasoned awards reflect the arbitrator’s expertise and ability,
enabling future arbitration parties to make more informed decisions in
hiring arbitrators.238 Reasoned awards may provide reliable clues on
whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers or engaged in
manifest disregard of the law. If reasoned awards’ supportive analyses
are regularly substandard, arbitration organizations may face market
accountability. The market pressure may force arbitration

explanation and findings of fact and conclusions of law requiring the
most.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
233. Id.
234. Id. (“Generally, an arbitrator need not explain her decision; thus, in a
typical arbitration where no specific form of award is requested, arbitrators may
provide a ‘standard award’ and simply announce a result.”).
235. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. Id.
237. Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest Disregard” of the Law
Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL.
117, 118–19 (1998) (stating that reasoned awards build public confidence in
arbitration).
238. Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration:
Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443, 501 (1998) (suggesting that
the parties should be vigilant on the front end to obtain credible reasoned awards
rather than relying on the judicial safety net of vacatur).
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organizations to train arbitrators in writing more effectively reasoned
awards. The availability of published reasoned awards, like that of
judicial opinions, will establish arbitration jurisprudence providing
informative guidance in future cases.239 Judges too may benefit from
reading reasoned awards in cases where arbitrators have trade-specific
expertise that judges do not have.240
D. Pro-arbitration Exuberance
State skepticism of arbitration makes most sense with respect to
MACs embedded in take-it-or-leave-it bargains. State legislatures
make rational and moral choices when they pass legislation to
protect consumers against corporate misconduct. For example,
businesses disfavor class action lawsuits. Ordinarily, consumers,
while buying goods and services, retain the right to a class action
lawsuit. Businesses, however, may be unwilling to do business
unless consumers sign arbitration agreements and waive class
actions.241 Thus arbitration has become a business tool to
circumvent class actions.242 A state legislature does no wrong if it
outlaws class action waivers in arbitration agreements.243 This
legislative choice reflects the reality of markets in which consumers
do not freely sign class action waivers. The state legislature has
every right, indeed a duty, to correct market conduct that
undermines consumer rights.
Pro-business judges use preemptive power under the FAA to
provide relief to businesses that cannot be obtained from state
legislatures.244 Businesses wield money and influence in democratic
processes at both federal and state levels.245 Business lobbies may
petition a state legislature against present and future barriers to
239. Labor arbitral awards are the most frequently published reasoned awards
and provide valuable information to unions and employers. Many publishers
provide labor arbitration awards. See Labor Arbitration Awards, WOLTERS
KLUWER, http://hr.cch.com/products /ProductID-158.asp.
240. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite, How Arbitrators Use and Create
Precedent, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1143 (2012) (finding that arbitrators in many
cases write detailed awards using court cases and other arbitral decisions).
241. See Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action
Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141, 141 (1997) (businesses use arbitration to shield
themselves against class action).
242. José Felipé Anderson, The Viability of Multi-Party Litigation as a Tool
for Social Engineering Six Decades After Restrictive Covenant Cases, 42
MCGEORGE L. REV. 765, 807 (2011) (criticizing the limiting of group litigation).
243. Id.
244. William E. Forbath, The Will of the People? Pollsters, Elites, and Other
Difficulties, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1191, 1203 (2010).
245. Id. at 1203–04.
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arbitration.246 If the legislature, despite lobbying, retains an old
barrier or enacts a new barrier to arbitration, the legislative action
embodies the will of the people of the state. Pro-business federal
judges should respect state arbitration policy choices.247 They
should not grant businesses an arbitration favor that the state
legislature has denied.248 Nor should they use the power of
preemption to dismantle “hundreds of state common law claims”
and regulations made to protect “consumers and workers against
corporate misconduct.”249 It is ironic that conservative judges,
otherwise vociferous defenders of states’ rights, abandon their
ideology of states’ rights in arbitration.
The autonomy paradigm views pro-arbitration exuberance with
caution and skepticism. Pro-business federal judges, enamored with
arbitration, are predisposed to strike down state barriers to
arbitration under the now worn-out slogan that state barriers are
vestiges of “judicial prejudice against arbitration.”250 Surely,
centuries ago, common law courts were reluctant to enforce predispute arbitration agreements. There is a difference, however,
between the so-called “historical prejudice” of common law judges
and the rational policy choices that elected state legislatures make
after due democratic deliberations. To protect consumers and
employees, state legislatures may exclude certain matters from the
scope of arbitration. Federal courts need to be careful, if not
reluctant, in preempting state legislation that refuses to ride the probusiness arbitration bandwagon.
The autonomy paradigm endorses congressional efforts to
oppose the unconscionability of MACs.251 State judges can also
undertake a more aggressive approach to reviewing MACs for their
compliance with fairness and freedom of contract. If pro-business
federal judges do not dampen their pro-arbitration exuberance in
upholding MACs, they will further entrench the arbitration blackout
of quasi-lawlessness.252
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 1202.
250. AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (holding that the
FAA preempted the California law barring the enforcement of class action waivers
in consumer contracts).
251. The autonomy of arbitration welcomes congressional efforts to regulate
MACs. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). This bill
would amend the FAA to include a provision stating: “[N]o predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment
dispute, consumer dispute, or civil rights dispute.” Id. § 402(a).
252. See Liaquat Ali Khan, Taking Ownership of Legal Outcomes: An
Argument Against Dissociation Paradigm and Analytical Gaming, 55 ST. LOUIS
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IX. CONCLUSION
The autonomy of arbitration proposed in this Article minimizes
court intervention into arbitration proceedings and outcomes.
Arbitration’s efficacy as an alternative method of dispute resolution
is dramatically increased when the arbitrator enjoys the same
powers as the trial judge in litigation. Arbitration law recognizes the
arbitrator’s procedural powers to order discovery, issue injunctions,
and issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses, etc.253 The law
also recognizes the arbitrator’s powers to grant punitive damages,
attorney’s fees, and other forms of exemplary relief.254 In order to
further fortify the autonomy paradigm, parties should authorize the
arbitrator to decide questions of the existence, validity, and
enforceability of the arbitration agreement, including questions of
arbitrability arising under fractional arbitration.255 Parties should
subscribe to the emergency procedures of an arbitration organization
to eliminate the need to go to court to obtain relief before the
arbitrator is selected.256 Likewise, parties should opt for the
appellate procedures of an arbitration organization to review the
legality and enforceability of an arbitration award.257 Under the
combined powers of arbitration law and arbitration agreements,
arbitral litigation can be minimized.
Arbitral autonomy refuses to support an arbitration blackout that
promotes deviations from legal values critical to the maintenance of
fairness and justice.258 Specifically, MACs threaten the integrity and
morality of arbitral autonomy.259 These clauses are embedded in
take-it-or-leave-it bargains to undermine the right to class actions,
punitive damages, and other remedies.260 MACs, coupled with
arbitration secrecy and lack of reasoned awards, establish a regime

U. L.J. 887 (2011) (arguing that judges are responsible for the legal outcomes their
reasonings produce).
253. See Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Del. Cnty., Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that arbitrator had the power under FAA to subpoena a
third party to produce documents and to testify at a deposition); Meadows Indem.
Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (holding that because
the burden was minimal, the nonparty would have to produce documents pursuant
to arbitrator’s subpoena under FAA).
254. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 21(amended 2000).
255. See supra Parts IV, V.
256. See supra Part VI.B.
257. See supra Part VII.
258. See supra Part VIII.
259. See supra Part VIII.
260. See supra Part VIII.
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of dispute resolution detrimental to arbitral autonomy.261 If MACs
are made immune from judicial scrutiny, arbitral autonomy will be
disparaged as a jurisprudential construct that favors corporate
interests, hides corporate misconduct, and harms the weak and the
vulnerable.262

261. See supra Part VIII.
262. See supra Part VIII.

